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ABSTRACT 
 
In the early centuries of Islam, the term caliph was referred to the 
highest leader of the Muslim community. He had two roles; firstly 
as a ruler practicing the roles of the Prophet and secondly as a 
religious leader leading the communal prayers.
1
  The Caliphate 
has appeared for fourteen centuries and was abolished by 
Mustafa Kemal Atātūrk in 1924. Although Muslims have been 
without caliph for ninety years, heated controversy on the 
restoration of the Caliphate has been debated among Egyptians 
since 1920s until 2015. This thesis aims to answer the caliphate 
question,” is the Caliphate obligatory in Shari’a?” by conducting a 
historical analysis of the views of six sunni scholars and the 
group of Islam State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on the caliphate 
from 1920s to 2014. Two of the six sunni scholars, ‘Alī ‘Abdal 
Rāziq and Nasr Hāmyd Abū Zayd argued that the Caliphate had 
no foundations neither in the Qur’an nor Sunna. The other sunni 
scholars, ‘Abdal -Rāziq al-Sanhūrī, Muhammad ‘Imāra, Hasan 
al-Banā, Ibn Taymiyya and ISIS believed in the obligation of the 
Caliphate in Shari’a.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
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I. Introduction: 
Will the Caliphate be reestablished in 2015 after ninety years following its abolishment by Mustafa 
Kemal Atātūrk? In June 2014, on the first day of the month of Ramadan, the leaders of the Islamic 
state of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) proclaimed that the Caliphate had been reestablished and declared Abū 
Bakr Al- Baghdādī is the caliph of Muslims.
2
The declaration of the establishment of the Caliphate by 
ISIS led to heated debate and concern worldwide. President Obama believes that ISIS is dangerous 
and a threat to the world; he has promised Americans to face this group through a well counter-
terrorism plan.
3
 There were other reactions. More than 120 Muslim Leaders and scholars signed an 
open letter issued on Wednesday September 2014, addressed to al- Baghdādī, criticizing ISIS’s 
actions and ideology based on the Qur’an. They argue that the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate 
and practices are illegitimate in Islam.
4
 In addition, Ahmed al-Tayeb, the current Imam of al-Azhar 
argued that ISIS’s actions of killing innocent people, demolishing mosques and causing violence 
made by ISIS are against Islam.
5
 The Caliphate has raised considerable debate in 2014; this is not 
the first time the issue has been raised. Since the 1920s, disagreement on the obligation of the 
Caliphate has been debated among Egyptians. No decision has yet been taken by al-Azhar regarding 
whether the Caliphate is an obligatory injunction, or Fard Wāgeb, in Shari a. After the publication of 
“Al Khilāfa wa Soltat al- Umma” in 1924, which calls for the separation between the state and the 
Caliphate, 
6
 and after the abolishment of the Caliphate in Turkey in 1924, ‘Alī ‘Abd al-Rāziq, published 
his book “Al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm” in 1925 discussing his points of view regarding the reasons why 
the Caliphate is not obligatory in Shari ‘a.  At that time Rāziq faced a lot of criticism because of his 
book.  By decision of the body of the ‘ulama of al-Azhar, Rāziq was dismissed from the body of the 
‘ulama of al-Azhar and was dismissed from his position as a judge in the Shari ‘a Courts.
7
After the 
publication of Rāziq’s book, several authors decided to respond to Rāziq by writing articles criticizing 
his arguments or by writing books to insure the obligation of the Caliphate in Shari ‘a. For example, 
Rashīd Ridā published an article in al-Manār arguing that Rāziq’s book was a new effort to abolish the 
Caliphate and mislead the Muslims. Additionally, Rashid Ridā mentioned that the ‘ulama would be 
responsible of the entire umma if they did not react to the book.
8
 When the ‘ulama began to take 
action against Rāziq, Ridā was assured that he was the first to push them against Rāziq in the 
articles he published in al-Manār and other journals like al-Liwā’ and al-Akhbār.
9
 Moreover, ten pages 
                                                          
2
 ‘Adel Shabhūn, Kheta Amneya ‘khskariya limowāghat Mashro3 Dakh’sh or Military Security Plan to face ISIS’s Caliphate Project, 
AL-AHRāM, June 10, 2014, http://digital.ahram.org.eg/Policy.aspx?Serial=1636753 . 
3
 TRANSCRIPT: PRESIDENT OBAMA’S SPEECH ON COMBATING ISIS AND TERRORISIM (Sep. 11, 2014), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/transcript-obama-syria-isis-speech/. 
4
 OPEN LETTER TO Al-BAGHDADI (Sep. 11, 2014), http://lettertobaghdadi.com/index.php. 
5
 Lo’ay ‘Ali, Nanshor arā’ Ahl Al-Sunna fī Tanzīm Dakh’sh or Publishing the Opinions of Sunni Scholars on ISIS, AL- YAWM AL- 
SāBA’,  Sep. 1, 2014. 
6
. NASR HāMYD ABū ZAYD, AL-KHILāFA WA SOLTAT Al UMMA 29 (2d ed. 1995). 
7
  ‘ALī  ‘ABD AL-RāZIQ,  AL-ISLāM WA USūL AL-ḤUKM DIRāSA WA WATHā’IQ 22 ( 2d ed. 1988). 
8
 Rashīd Ridā, AL-MANāR,  100-104. 
9
 Rashīd Ridā, AL-MANāR 212. 
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of ‘Abdel al-Rāziq Sanhūrī’s book “Fiqh Al Khilāfa  wa Tataworhā” were criticized  Rāziq’s arguments. 
And of course, all al-Azhar scholars were against Rāziq’s opinion and were certain of the necessity of 
the Caliphate in Shari ‘a. Lastly, the Salafist press participated in this attack against Rāziq; the 
Salafist members distributed free pamphlets discussing Rāziq ‘s judgment by al-Azhar.
10
 Hence, the 
disagreements among Egyptians in the 1920s regarding this issue were well-known and public. 
If we leave the 1920s and focus on the period after the 25
th
 January revolution in 2011, we see the 
same debate. Although the caliph position was abolished, since no decision has yet been taken by al-
Azhar scholars regarding whether or not the Caliphate is obligatory in Shari ‘a. The Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Salafists insist on the necessity of the Caliphate because it is one of the 
obligations in Shari ‘a. For example, Yasser Borhāmī, a Salafist preacher, said the Caliphate is 
obligatory in Shari ‘a and every Muslim has to join the entire Islamic group which is calling for the 
establishment of the Caliphate.
11
 Also, several of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood and their 
general guide Mohamed Badī’ have called for the creation of the Caliphate; Badī’ expressed its 
urgency. He said the reestablishment of the Caliphate is important because it is one of the goals 
recognized by Imam Hasan al-Banā.
12
 Hence the debate continues unabated. Currently there is 
disagreement between the liberals, secularist, leftist and the rights, who do not want to see 
establishment of the Caliphate, and the Islamic group, who are calling for its creation.
13
   
It is important to answer the Caliphate question to put an end of the heated debate by the Arabs and 
scholars regarding this issue. If we take a look over the Islamic history, we see the Caliphate has 
caused controversy between Muslims in every era. It is hard to take the answer of the question from 
al-Azhar as it has a very contracting position. In 1925, it insured the obligation of the Caliphate in 
Shari ‘a, and dismissed Rāziq from the body of ‘ulama. Then in 1945, once again it rewarded Rāziq 
his certificate ‘ālim and reinstated him in the Council of ‘ulama. The position of al-Azhar is confusing 
in that it re-gave Rāziq his certificate. One could argue that al-Azhar might reject its first position and 
take a new view on the Caliphate, but it is yet to be claimed. 
This paper argues that the Caliphate has no foundation in the Prophetic government and the Qur’an. 
It tackles the issue that the Caliphate was harmful for Muslims as it did not help Muslims and Islam to 
be stabilized. It argues that ISIS’s declaration of the Caliphate is invalid. The paper ends with a 
discussion proving that implementing Shari‘a does depend on the establishment of the Caliphate and 
the Islamic government is a civil government. 
                                                          
10
 Supra note 7 at, 9. 
11
 Yasser Borhāmī, AL-KHILāFAH AL-ISLāMIYYA BAYN AL-HAKīKA WA AL-KHAYāL (Augest 8, 2014), 
http://www.islamion.com/post.php?post=16812. 
12
 Muhammed Hagag, Badi’L Al-Khilāfah Al-Rāsheda Wa Ihyā’ Dawlat Al-Islām Wa Al-Shari’a Hadaf Al-Ikhwān  or Badi’: The Rightly 
Guided Caliphs and Revving the Islamic State and Shair’a is the goal of the Muslim Brotherhood, AL- YAWM AL- SāBA’, March 3, 
2013. 
13
 Muhammed Hagag, Badi’L Al-Khilāfah Al-Rāsheda Wa Ihyā’ Dawlat Al-Islām Wa Al-Shari’a Hadaf Al-Ikhwān  or Badi’: The Rightly 
Guided Caliphs and Revving the Islamic State and Shair’a is the goal of the Muslim Brotherhood, AL- YAWM AL- SāBA’, March 3, 
2013. 
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In this paper ‘Alī ‘Abd al-Rāziq and Nasr Hāmyd Abū Zayd were chosen as both of them are liberal, 
Islamist and have the same position on the Caliphate. Additionally, both scholars faced a lot of harm 
because of publishing books arguing their opinions relating to Islam and their books led to heated 
discussions amongst scholars. On the one hand, as I mentioned above the body of the ‘ulama of al-
Azhar, dismissed Rāziq from the body of the ‘ulama and from his position as a judge in the Shari ‘a 
Courts because his ideas contained in his book “Al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm”. On the other hand, in 
1992 Abū Zayd presented several academic publications like Imām Shāfi‘ī, the Founding of Medieval 
Ideology and the Critique of Religious Discourse to the Standing Committee of Academic Tenure and 
Promotion for advancement at Cairo University. Because of his academic publication, the Critique of 
Religious Discourse, arguing his views on the Qur’an, Abū Zayd was refused tenure at Cairo 
University and was accused of being apostate. In addition, a case was filed against him before the 
Personal Status Court asking for the divorce of Abū Zayd from his wife Dr. Ibthāl Yūnis on the 
grounds that a Muslim woman cannot marry an apostate. In 1994 the Court rejected the case 
because the plaintiff did not have any personal interest in the matter. However, in 1995 the Cairo 
Appeals Court reversed the decision and declared that the marriage of Abū Zayd and Dr. Ibthāl Yūnis 
was null. 
 ‘Abdal -Rāziq al-Sanhūrī, Muhammad ‘Imāra, Hasan al-Banā, Ibn Taymiyya and ISIS were chosen 
as all of them believed that the Caliphate is positive as it unites Muslims and it implements Shari’a. 
‘Abdal -Rāziq al-Sanhūrī was chosen because although he was a leftist, his ideas on the Caliphate 
were like the Islamists. Additionally, he published his dissertation Le Califat, évolution vers une 
société des nations oriental in 1926 after the publishing of Rāziq’s book which included ten pages that 
respond to Rāziq’s ideas. 
 Muhammad ‘Imāra was chosen to highlight a contradictory position to Rāziq’s thinking and because 
of his intellectual evolution. In his youth, ‘Imāra was Marxist and fought against imperialism, which 
incorporated secular leftist thinking. In the 1990s he turned against Marxism and became an Islamist.  
Hasan al-Banā was chosen to include his ideology on the Caliphate in order to understand the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology on the issue as the majority of them are inspired by him. Ibn Taymiyya 
was also chosen as a considerable amount of Salafist thinking is a reference to Ibn Taymiyya. Finally, 
ISIS was chosen to show that until 2015 the Caliphate debate continues unabated. 
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II. The Caliphate, Shari ‘a Sources, and Injunctions  
This chapter begins with a general idea about the Caliphate followed by a definition for each source of 
Shari ‘a, the Qur’an, Sunna, ijma’, or consensus and qyās or analogy and types of injunctions in Shari ‘a 
Fard 'Etiqaadī and Fard'Amalī. It is necessary to provide an explanation for Shari ‘a sources and 
injunctions before presenting the ideas of Rāziq, Sanhūrī and Abū Zayd as all of them discuss the Shari 
‘a sources. 
A. Muslims understanding of the Caliphate: 
According to Muslims, the Caliphate is the person who has the authority of the caliph becomes the 
Prophet’s successor.
14
 The caliph represents the power of God and God’s shadow on Earth. 
15
 The 
caliph has the same authority of God and the Prophet.
16
  According to the Sunnis, there are several 
conditions that must be present in the caliph like; he has to be a Muslim, free, healthy, brave, fair and 
Qurayshī. 
B. Sources of Shari ‘a: 
The word Shari ‘a means in Arabic “the road to the watering place”.
17
 Shari’a involves religious, 
ordinances and secular norms. There are four sources of Shari ‘a: the Qur’an, Sunna, ijmā‘, or 
consensus, and Qyās or analogy. The primary sources of Shari ‘a are the Quran and Sunna and the 
secondary sources are the ijmā‘ and Qyās. The Qur’an is the first source of Shari ‘a and considered to be 
the word of God, and has 5 features: “It was revealed to the Prophet; it was put in writing; it is all 
mutawātir, or Hadiths; it is speech of God; and it is recited in prayer.”
18
 
The second source of Shari ‘a is the Sunna, which means a way of behavior for life.
19
 In the legal context, 
Sunna refers to the behavior, actions and the saying of the Prophet.”
20
 In Shari ‘a if there is a conflict 
between the Qur’an and the Sunna, the Qur’an’s authority is higher than the Sunna.
21
 
The third source of Shari ‘a is the ijmā‘, which is the consensus of the scholars of a certain era on a 
certain opinion. Another definition of ijmā‘ is ”the unanimous agreement of the Mujtāhidūn, or Islamic 
Jurists, of the Muslim community of any period following the demise of the Prophet Muhammad on any 
matter.”
22
 (A mujtahid) is a well-educated scholar in Shari ‘a.
23
 Unlike the Qur’an and the Sunna which are 
considered divine, the ijmā‘ is not divine.
24
 Ijmā‘ cannot be inconsistent with the Qur’an and the Sunna.
25
 
                                                          
14
 Supra note 7 at 113-114. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id. 
17
 R Landeawa, ISLAM AND YHE ARABS 141 (1958). 
18
 MUHAMMAD HASHIM KAM’ALĪ  , PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 16 (3d ed. 2003). 
19
 C. G. WEERAMANTRY, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 34 (1988). 
20
 M. CHERIF BASSIONI & GAMAL M. BADR, The Shari'a: sources, Interpretation, and RULE- Making, 135, 148 (2002). 
21
 Supra note 19, at 34. 
22
 Supra note 18, at 16. 
23
 Supra note 19, at 41. 
24
 Supra note 18, at, 16. 
25
 Supra note 19, at 34. 
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Finally, the fourth source of Shari ‘a is the Qyās.
26
 Muslims scholars use Qyās only in case if the Qur’an 
and the Sunna are silent in a certain issue.
27
 The Qyās cannot modify the law because every individual 
has a personal belief in the content of law.
28
   
C. Types of injunctions:  
1. In Shari ‘a, there are two types of injunctions. Fard obligatory or Fard E'tiqādī which is taken 
from Shari ‘a and verified by certain evidence; one example of the obligatory acts is performing 
the five daily prayers. And Fard 'Amalī which is not proven by Shari ‘a using a certain 
arguments but is necessary in view of the consensus of "Mujtahids" (Islamic jurists) based on 
reason. One example of the Fard 'Amalī, if the Qur’an and Sunna do not state the obligation of 
the Caliphate, and Muslim jurists agree its necessity based on reasoning, so the act would be 
indefinite obligatory. There are two kinds of Fard 'Amalī. 
The First, Fard 'Ain, is the duty that has to be executed by every Muslim like the five daily prayers. 
The second, Fard Kifāyah is “a general duty of believers whose performance by only some 
Muslims will absolve all and if not performed by even a single believer then all will be held 
responsible for the sin like washing the dead and funeral prayer.”
29
 This means that Fard Kifāyah is 
an obligation that must be executed by all Muslims. If some of them execute it, the other Muslims 
will not be punished. 
 
After the general idea of the Caliphate, sources and injunctions of Shari ‘a, a historical overview of the 
Caliphate starting from the death of the Prophet to the Ottoman Caliphate is presented. It includes the 
rise and fall of all the Caliphates starting from the rightly guided caliphs to the Ottoman Caliphate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26
 Supra note 18, at 16. 
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. 
29
 TERMINOLOGY OF SHARI'AH'S COMMANDS, http://www.islamicacademy.org/html/Books/GLIS/tsc.htm. 
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III. Rise and fall of the Sunni Caliphate: 
The rise and fall of the Sunni Caliphate was marked by expanding the Islamic territory and political 
fragmentation which started from the third caliph ‘uthmān. This chapter begins with a discussion of the 
rightly guided caliphs and ends with the last Caliphate, the Ottoman Caliphate. This shows how the 
Caliphate started with allegiance the caliphs and ended with inheriting the Caliphate. 
The Caliphate has been divided into three eras: the rightly guided caliphs era extending from 632 to 661, 
the Umayyad Empire from 661 to750 and the Abbasid Empire from 750 to 1258. 
30
 
A. Rightly guided caliphs (632-661) 
The rightly guided caliphs began in 632 and ended in 661 has been considered as Khilāfa al-nubuwwa or 
the ideal government as Ibn Taymiyya mentioned. The rightly guided caliphs began in 632; the first four 
caliphs were the companions of the Prophet.
31
 Muslims believe that the Prophet died without choosing a 
successor.
32
After a period of doubt, the Prophet‘s companions and elders of Medina selected Abū Bakr to 
be the first caliph.
33
 Abū Bakr, as a caliph, was the political and military leader of the community. 
34
 Before 
giving him the title of caliph, Prophet Muhammad picked him to lead the prayer in his absence.
35
 After 
resolving the question of the Caliphate, Abū Bakr wanted to unite Muslim rule in Arabia. However, after 
the death of the Prophet, several tribes rebelled. Several tribal chiefs said that their fidelity was based on 
a political pact with Medina that stopped with the Prophet’s death.
36
  The independence of the tribes 
threated the unity of the new Islamic state.
37
 At that time, Abū Bakr was convinced that the unity of the 
community was based on the strong relationship between faith and politics. Thus, he undertook a series 
of battles that were called the wars of apostasy or “ridda”.  
Abū Bakr’s successor was ‘Umar Ibn al-khatāb, who had a new title which is amīr al-muminin.
38
 ‘Umar 
was the one who started the great period of expansion and victory; he was one of the best military 
leaders of his time. He also created a new system for the choice of his successor or the next caliph.
39
 
Before his death, he appointed a committee in order to choose his successor. After consultation, the 
committee chose ‘Uthmān Ibn ‘Affān,
40
 consequently, the first three caliphs were chosen by the 
Quraysh.
41
 
‘Uthmān’s family was considered the strongest party against the Prophet Muhammed. Several of the 
Mednian Elite, who supported the Prophet, hated ‘uthmān’s succession to power and the increased 
                                                          
30
 JOHN EPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 37 (1988). 
31
 THE RIGHTLY GUIDED CALIPHS, http://www.religionfacts.com/islam/history/caliphs.htm. 
32
 Supra note 30, at 38. 
33
 Id. 
34
 Id. 
35
 Id. 
36
 THE RIGHTLY GUIDED CALIPHS, http://www.religionfacts.com/islam/history/caliphs.htm. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Supra note 30, at 38. 
40
 Supra note, 31. 
41
 Supra note, 30 at 39. 
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wealth of his family.
42
 Although it was well-known during that time that ‘Uthmān did not have the same 
skills of leadership as the previous caliphs, accusations that he was weak caliph and guilty of nepotism 
fueled intrigue. 
43
In 656, ‘Uthmān was assassinated by a group of rebels in Egypt and his murder was the 
first in a series of Muslim rebellions. 
44
 
‘Alī was the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet and the fourth caliph. Although ‘Alī did not rule for long 
time, the Caliphate during his time faced two civil wars fitna and trials. ‘Alī’’s authority was threatened by 
two opposition movements. 
45
The first opposition movement was a group headed by the Prophet’s widow, 
Aisha the daughter of Abū Bakr; the second opposition movement was challenged by the forces of 
Mu‘áūya , the governor of Syria at that time and a relative of ‘uthman.
46
 ‘Alī s failure to find and punish the 
killers of ‘Uthmān became the main reason of both revolts.
47
 Ali won the battle of Cammle against the 
coalition of Aisha, but he was killed during the war with Mu‘áūya by Kharijites in 662. 
48
 
After ‘Alī’s murder, Mu‘áūya succeeded as caliph, and moving his capital to Damascus. 
49
With the 
creation of The Umayyad Caliphate, the Caliphate became an absolute monarchy.
50
 
B. Umayyad Caliphate (661-750): 
The righteous period was followed by the Umayyad Empire which was accused of depending on 
hereditary kingship. Unlike the first four caliphs who did not obtain power by coercion. They had been 
chosen by Muslims. Mu‘áūya inherited the Caliphate to his son Yazīd as caliph before his death in 680.  
The advent of the Umayyad authority expanded and centralized which transformed the Islamic community 
from being an Arab shaykhdom into an Islamic empire whose rulers relied on religion for legitimacy and 
the military for power and stability. 
51
 
Mu‘áūya was the caliph from 661 to 680 and he lead the Umayyad era from 661 to 750.
52
 During this time 
the capital was moved to Damascus.
53
 Islamic territory extended quickly. From this new center, the 
Umayyads over “the entire Persian and half of the Roman (Byzantine) empire”. 
54
When Mu‘áūya 
controlled the power, Islam had already spread to several countries such as Libya, Iraq and Egypt.
55
 
Furthermore, during the Umayyad Empire, Muslims also controlled many countries like Spain, Portugal 
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and Maghreb (North Africa).
56
 Damascus became stronger imperial capital than it had been under 
Byzantine rule. 
57
 
In addition to the territory’s expansion, Umayyad rulers developed a strong Arab empire.
58
 Umayyad 
rulers amended the more advanced government, institutions, and bureaucracy of Byzantium to Arab 
Muslim needs; 
59
furthermore, the language of government became Arabic as well as the lingua franca. 
60
During the Umayyad Empire, Caliphs were the protectors of the faith and charged with extending the 
rule of Islam. 
61
What made the Umayyad united and stabilized was the establishment of an Arab 
monarchy and reliance on Arab, in particular Syrian, warriors. 
62
Contrary to the rightly guided caliphs who 
were elected, hereditary succession restricted the Caliphate to the Umayyad house. 
63
This new practice 
became the excuse for later Muslim historians, writing under Abbasid patronage, to denounce Umayyad 
rule as kingship and thus un-Islamic.
64
 In addition, Arab Muslims enjoyed special tax privileges that were 
applied on non-Arab Muslims and non-Muslims. 
65
This practice became controversial among non-Arab 
Muslims (mawāly) who considered their lesser status as a violation of Islamic equality. 
66
Their alienation 
eventually helped to the downfall of the Umayyad Empire.
67
 Despite all the accomplishments of the 
Umayyad rulers in the 18
th
 century, (720), those anti-Umayyad spread. Anti-Umayyad included non-Arab 
Muslims (mawāly), Kharijites and Shī’ī , who considered the Umayyad as usurpers. 
68
It also included Arab 
Muslims in Medina, Mecca, and Iraq, who disliked the privileged status of Syrian families and pious 
Muslims, Arab and non-Arab, who see that the life style of the Umayyad was unlike the Islamic way of 
life.
69
 Opposition groups started for calling to the return to Qur’an and Sunna.
70
 By 747, an opposition 
movement had begun considerable, with a great Shī’ī support rallied behind Abū Muslim, a freed Abbasid 
slave.
71
 By 750, the Umayyad Empire had fallen, and Abū Abās, a descendant of the Prophet's uncle al- 
Abās, was declared to be the caliph.
72
 After this event, Islam’s capital was moved from Damascus to 
Baghdad.
73
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C. Abbasid Caliphate: Development of Islamic Civilization (750-1258): 
 
The Umayyad period was followed by the Abbasid Caliphate which started in 750 and ended in 1258. The 
Abbasid caliphs depended on hereditary kingship like the Umayyad Empire. After the death of Abū al-
‘Abās in 754, his brother Abū Jafar ‘Abdallah ibn Muhammad who had a title attached to his name al-
Mansūr became the caliph of Muslims. During the Abbasid rule, the Islamic state had a strong centralized 
government, had a prosperous economy and civilization. 
74
 Abū al-‘Abās took the title of “the blood 
shedder” al-safāh.
75
 The Abbasid caliphs united their power by first divesting their opponent and their Shī’ī 
supporters. 
76
 The Abbasids came to power under the title of Islam; they took care of their government 
with Islam.
77
 For example, they became the great supporters of an emerging religious class, the ‘Ulamā 
religious scholars, they encouraged the development of Islamic scholarship and disciplines, and they built 
mosques, and schools.
78
 The Abbasids controlled a great empire from the Atlantic to central Asia.
79
 
However, Abbasids political unity failed quickly from 861 to 945 as religious Khariji and Shī’ī \and regional 
differences, and particularly competing political aspirations, led to a revolt.
80
   By the thirteenth century, 
the Abbasid Empire had become very weak; it was an empire in name only.
81
 Pouring out of Central Asia, 
the armies of Genghis Khan captured several countries like China and much of Central Asia and the Near 
East.
82
 In 1258, the Mongol army under Hulagu Khan, the grandson of Genghis Khan, captured Baghdad 
after killing Muslims citizens and burning the city.
83
 Only Egypt and Syria were far from the Mongol 
conquest of the Muslim empire. 
84
 In Egypt, the Mamlūks the owned ones, Turkish slave soldier, who 
served as a sort of Praetorian Guard, sized power from their Ayyubid Fatimid masters. The Mamlūks 
sultanate successfully resisted the Mongols and ruled until 1517. 
D. Abbasid Caliphate in Cairo and Mamlūks Sultanayye (1250-1517): 
The Mamlūks were constituted by soldiers and regiments. The Mamlūks came after killing the last 
Ayyubid sultan of Egypt in 1250. Salves were trained to be soldiers and were educated the Qur’an, 
Islamic Law, Arabic language and Muslim prayers.
85
 Several of the slaves were appointed to high 
positions by the state, and even gained the position of sultan.
86
The situation changed in 1261 when the 
Mamlūks sultan Baybars received a letter stating that the son of the caliph al-Nasir had arrived in 
Damascus. Four days after the arrival of the letter, Baybars pledged the oath of allegiance to the next 
caliph who took the title al-Mustansr. The time of al-Mustansir was short; he was murdered in a battle 
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against the Mongols in Iraq in 1262. After the death of al-Mustansir, Baybars would recognize another 
pretender. 
 Despite the Mamlūks sultans recognized the reputed Abbasids in Cairo, it is nonetheless erroneous to 
think that the reinstalled caliphs were of any practical significance to the daily administration of the 
sultanate. By Baybars’s investing in the Islamic countries, the caliph became very weak, it was no more 
than sultan’s stamp of legitimacy in securing the latter’s claim as a universal sultan of Islam. The Abbasid 
Caliphate in Cairo ended when the Ottoman sultan Selīm I defeated the Egyptian Mamlūks  in 1517, and 
transported the last Abbasid caliph in Cairo, al-Mutawakkil III, and his family to Istanbul, where he was 
rumored to have transferred the Caliphate to Selīm. From that point, the centuries old Abbasid dynasty 
passed into obscurity. 
E. Ottoman Caliphate (1299-1924): 
The Abbasid Caliphate was followed by the Ottoman Empire which was considered the largest empire 
and lasted the longest time in history. The Ottoman Empire expanded to the Arab Middle East and North 
Africa; it incorporated several Islamic cities like Cairo, Tunis, Medina, Damascus, Mecca, as well as great 
Islamic centers like al-Azhar in Egypt and Tunisia’s Zaytūna Mosque University.
87
 The Ottoman Empire 
captured several countries like Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Tripoli and the Balkans and much of Eastern 
Europe. During the 1600s the Ottoman Empire had evolved to include a population of 500,000 people 
and became international.
88
The Ottoman Empire became successful for several reasons; from the Islamic 
world, many artists and scholars were appointed, Muslim conquerors were great builders of civilization.
89
 
The Ottoman Empire survived until the twentieth century when it was dismantled by the British and the 
French during the post-World War I period. 
90
The Empire officially ended on the 1st of November 1922, 
when Turkey was declared a republic and the Ottoman sultanate was abolished. The Ottoman Caliphate 
continued as an institution, till it was abolished on the 3rd of March 1924. 
The rise and fall of the Sunni Caliphate ending in 1924, an action which Muslims were concerned about; it 
was strange for them to not have a caliph. The following chapter presents the debate of the Caliphate 
between the four Imams, Abū Hanifā, Mālek Ibn Ans, Shāf’ī and Ibn Hanbal  followed by the debate of the 
Caliphate issue between two scholars, Rāziq and Sanhūrī. This is followed by a discussion for the 
reasons behind the disappearance of the Caliphate debate from 1950s to 1970s. 
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IV. Caliphate debate from 1920s to 1940s: 
Before presenting the debate of the six scholars and ISIS on the Caliphate, it is important to start the 
debate of the Caliphate by presenting the thought of the four Imams Abū Hanifā, Mālek Ibn Ans, Shāf’ī 
and Ibn Hanbal to know their beliefs in the Caliphate. The four Imams Abū Hanifā, Mālek Ibn Ans, Shāf’ī 
and Ibn Hanbal agreed that the Caliphate is a Fard. They depended on ijmā‘ based on an incident. 
Following the Prophet’s death in 632, Muslims agreed quickly to hire a caliph in order to lead the Islamic 
community.
91
The four Imams argued that Muslims must have a caliph to manage their religious affairs 
and Muslims could not have two caliphs in the same time. According to the four Imams, there are several 
conditions that must be present in the caliph like; he has to be a Muslim, adult, free, male, Qurayshī, fair, 
brave, healthy, and good decision maker. The four Imams agreed that the choosing of the caliph could be 
based on the allegiance of fair scholars or on unanimous consensus as Abū Bakr chose ‘Umar to be his 
successor before his death. 
 In addition, the four Imams agreed that the judgments of the caliph and his assistant are final. Muslims 
could not disobey the caliph if he involved all the mentioned conditions and if they do so, the caliph could 
fight them. They added Muslims only could revolt against the caliph if he did a sin.
92
  
Like Sanhūrī, ‘Imāra, al-Banā and Ibn Taymiyya, The Four Imams argued that the Caliphate is significant 
to manage the religious affairs of the Muslims. In addition, like al-Banā, the four Imams argued that 
citizens cannot revolt against the caliph scaring from the anarchy unless he did a sin.  Here the four 
imams did not define what does it mean by sin. Additionally, they did not mention if they agreed that the 
Caliphate is a Fard obligatory or Fard Kifāyah.  
The Caliphate issue was subject to considerable debate during the 1920s for several reasons. One 
reason is because the Muslim world was worried about the Caliphate after Atātūrk’s abolishing it in 1924 
after its evolution. Second reason is because the ‘ulama of al-Azhar called for a congress in order to 
restore the Caliphate. The congress ended without resolving the problem. The cause given was that 
Muslims during that time were not united and politics was characterized by its weakness. Third reason is 
that at the end of the nineteenth century a secular idea appeared in Egypt calling for the separation of 
state and religion. What follows are Rāziq and ‘Abdel Rāziq Sanhūrī’s positions concerning the Caliphate. 
Rāziq ignored the Caliphate in Shari ‘a while Sanhūrī depended on ijmā‘ and reasoning to insure that the 
Caliphate was Fard Kifāyah. 
A. Caliphate in Rāziq’s legal thought: 
The Caliphate in Rāziq’s thinking was the lack of stating the Caliphate in the first three sources of Shari ’a 
and reasoning. He published his book Al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm to prove the world that the Caliphate is 
not obligatory in Shari ’a. 
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After the abolishment of the Caliphate in Turkey in 1924, and after the publication of”al-Khilāfa  wa Soltat 
Al Umma” in 1924 by ‘Abd al-Ghani Sunnī, which called for the division between the authority and the 
Caliphate, 
93
 Rāziq published his book Al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm. Rāziq believed that the Caliphate’s 
foundation was neither in the law nor by reasoning. The following discusses Rāziq’s arguments on how 
the issue of the Caliphate is ignored in the Qur’an, sunna, Ijmā‘ and reasoning. 
Rāziq’s roots helped to form his thinking. Rāziq was born in 1888 in Abū Jirj; his father and brother were 
liberals and fought against the British rule in Egypt and supporters of the monarchy. 
94
 Rāziq was 
educated in the traditional Islamic Curriculum and graduated from al-Azhar University as an ‘ālim in 
1915.
95
 After Rāziq’s graduation from al-Azhar University; Later, Rāziq studied politics and economics at 
Oxford University; he did not spend a long time there due to the First World War.
96
 Later, Rāziq became 
an Arabic teacher and a judge in the traditional courts of Alexandria.
97
 Rāziq started working on his 
research, the question of the Caliphate during his post graduate years.
98
 His research ended with 
publication of his book” Al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm”. This book let to controversy among Egyptians and 
harmed Rāziq. 
1. Caliphate in the Qur’an Sunna and ijmā‘: 
For Rāziq the Caliphate is not pronounced by the Qur’an or Sunna or ijmā‘. In the following paragraph, he 
argued that the three sources ignored it. 
a) Caliphate in the Qur’an 
The first of Rāziq’s argument concerning the Caliphate is ignored in the Qur’an. Rāziq provided the 
meaning of several verses in the Qur’an, which several scholars still depend on them, clarifying that these 
verses do not support the argument in favor of the Caliphate.
99
 
“O believers obey God and obey the Prophet and those set in authority over you. If you dispute 
among yourselves over any matter, refer it to God and the Messenger, if you believe in God and the last 
day. This would be best, and best also in consequence.”
100
 
“When there comes to them a report, bearing news of security or of foreboding, they spread it wide. 
Were they to refer it to the Messenger and to those set in authority over them, its true import would be 
ascertained from them by those best fitted to understand it. Were it not for God’s bounty upon you and his 
mercy, you would have followed Satan, all but a few.”
101
 
Rāziq argued that the experts of the Qur’an defined the phrase of those in authority in the first verse 
as reference to the Muslim prince during the Prophet’s time; these included judges, military commanders 
and caliphs.
102
 On the other hand, the phrase those in authority in the second verse referred to “the most 
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acute-minded among the companions of the Prophet or to those who were in authority among 
them”.
103
Rāziq argued that the stated verses might be interpreted to mean that there are certain people 
among Muslims to be responsible for the conduct of their public affairs. This is a more general meaning 
than the theory of the Caliphate mentioned by the scholars calling for the Caliphate.
104
 
b) Caliphate in the Sunna: 
Like the first of Rāziq’s argument concerning the Caliphate is ignored in the Qur’an, the second of 
Rāziq’s argument concerning the Caliphate is ignored in the Sunna too. Rāziq analyzed the words of the 
Prophet in the Hadiths to insure that the Caliphate had no foundations in the Sunna. He argued if we 
analyze the words of the Prophet, we find nothing more than references to terminologies such as the 
“imamate,” allegiance”, “community”,
105
 found in the following hadiths: 
“The Imams should be of Qurayshī‘ origin; it is binding upon the community of Muslims; the person 
who dies without having sworn allegiance to an imam is like someone who dies without having adhered to 
Islam; if someone has given allegiance to an imam and committed his actions and sentiments to him, he 
is bound to obey him as far as possible; if some disputes the imam’s authority, he should be decapitated; 
and follow the example of those who came after me- Abū  Bakr, ‘Uthmān, and so on.”
106
 
 
Rāziq argued that nothing in the above hadiths required the obligation of the Caliphate, and the 
Islamic Community must be governed by caliph.
107
 Rāziq gave an example of Jesus Christs’s comment” 
render unto Caesar what is Caesars? Rāziq responded that the Biblical phrase does not mean that Jesus 
did not order for the creation of a divine foundation to Caesar’s government.
108
 The Bible does not 
recognize Caesar’s government’s being as obligatory in the Christian belief.
109
 No one who has an 
understanding of linguistic usage can interpret Jesus’ words in a manner that would make assumptions of 
this sort.
110
 Hence, according to Rāziq, the above mentioning of the concepts of “Caliphate, Imāma and 
allegiance in the Prophet’s hadiths do not mean anything beyond what Christ meant when he referred to 
the legal requirements pertaining to the government of Caesar.
111
  
 
c) Caliphate in ijmā‘: 
Like the Qur’an and Sunna, Rāziq believed that the Caliphate is ignored in the ijmā‘. For Rāziq People 
who claim that the issue of the Caliphate is supported by ijmā‘ base their argument on an incident which 
is well-known in the Islamic history. 
After the Prophet’s death, there was debate among the Muslims during the first era of Islam to ensure that 
the position of the Imam did not fall vacant. In point of fact, Abū Bakr declared that someone has to be the 
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Prophet’s successor to manage the Islamic community. Later Muslims agreed to select Abū Bakr as a 
caliph after the burial of the Prophet. From that time on, in every age, Muslims nominated an imam to 
administer and manage their affaires.
112
 Rāziq contested that depending on ijmā‘ based on the above 
incident is unjustifiable; whether ijmā‘ involves the companions of the Prophet, or along with the 
companions, it also includes the second generation of Muslims or the entire body of Muslim 
theologians.
113
 For Rāziq the Caliphate “referred to the choice of those who pledge and un-pledged their 
allegiance,” since the “imamate is a pledge which functions through those who pledge and un-pledge their 
allegiance to the one whom they chose, having consulted among themselves, to be the leader of the 
community and the imam of the umma.”
114
 This means that the Caliphate is based on voluntary 
allegiance; this had not happened in the history except for the first three caliphs; whoever came after 
gained their positions by the use of sheer coercion like the fourth and the fifth caliphs.
115
 
2. Caliphate in reasoning. 
Like the Qur’an, Sunna and ijmā‘, for Rāziq the Caliphate is ignored in reasoning too. 
a) Islamic government is not necessary: 
In Rāziq’s eyes, a government is important for any society to stabilize and manage its affaires, but the 
Caliphate as an Islamic government is not required. Rāziq argued that it is agreed among experts in 
public law that the best functioning in any civilized society, regardless its religion, race or language is 
having a government to stabilize the society and manage its affairs.
116
 Experts in public law did not agree 
on what form of government is the best system, as the forms of government might vary whether, 
constitutional or despotic, republican, or Bolshevik, and so on.
117
 Rāziq and Abū Bakr had the same 
consideration in mind,
118
 when Abū Bakr said” this religion (the community of believers) needs someone 
to take charge of its affairs.”
119
 Additionally, it seems that the Qur’an has the same view too. The following 
states the opinion of the Qur’an of the importance of existing a government: 
“Is it they who hand out the mercy of your lord? 
We distributed their livelihoods among them in this present life, and raised some Abū ve others in rank 
that might take others into their service. But the mercy of your lord is better than what they amass.”
120
 
“So let those who follow the Evangel judge in accordance with what God revealed in it. Who so judges not 
in accordance with what God revealed, these are the dissolute. 
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To you We revealed the Book with the Truth, confirming previous Scripture and witnessing to their 
veracity. So judge between them as God revealed and do not follow their whims, to turn you away from 
the truth revealed to you. 
For every community We decreed a law and a way of life. Had God willed, He could have made you a 
single community-but in order to test you in what He revealed to you. So vie with one another in virtue. To 
God is your homecoming, all of you, and He will then acquaint you with that over which differed. 
So judge between them as God revealed and do not follow their whines, and be ware lest they tempt you 
away certain things that God revealed to you. If they turn away in denial, know that God wishes to 
chastise them for some of their sins-several are the sinners among mankind! Do they truly desire the law 
of paganism? But who is fairer than God in judgment for a people firm of faith? 
O believers, take not Jews and Christians for allies; they are allies one of another. Who so among you 
takes them as allies is accounted of their number. God guides not the wrongdoers.”
121
 
Rāziq agreed with political scientists arguing the significance of any society to have a government; 
however, Rāziq disagreed with political scientists, if they defined the government’s significance means 
the Caliphate.
122
 
Rāziq believed that the Caliphate has always been a disaster for Islam and Muslims; it was characterized 
by corruption.
123
 For example Yazīd’s allegiance, the son of Mu‘áūya and a caliph of the Umayyads after 
his father was based on violence. during Yazīd’s nomination, Mu‘áūya said” when he dies, it will be him”: 
finally, showing his sword, he cried” and for those who object, it will be this.”
124
 Another example of the 
Umayyads, when Yazīd violated the noble blood of the Prophet‘s line in the personage of Husayn, son of 
Fatima, the daughter of God’s messenger.
125
 
b) Islam is a message from God: 
For Rāziq the Prophet was not a king having authority over Muslims. In order to prove this point, Rāziq 
mentioned an incident, “a man introduced himself to the Prophet with a matter in hand. Finding himself in 
the presence of the Prophet, he was overawed and shook with fear. The Prophet said to him, “be calm for 
I am neither a king not a tyrant. I am but the son of a Qurayshī‘ woman who used to partake of salted 
meat.
126
” 
In addition, for Rāziq the Prophet’s mission was only delivering and teaching the divine law; he cited 
several verses in the Qur’an proving this point. 
127
As we see Rāziq believed the Caliphate is ignored in 
the first three sources of Shari ‘a and in reasoning. After Rāziq published his book in the first of April 
1925, sixty-three of the 'Ulama' scholars sent an open letter to al-Azhar on June 25, 1925 explaining their 
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unacceptable views of the book.
128
 Other letters were sent to the book itself in order to defend Islam 
against the book’s ideas. 
129
Additionally, Ridā claimed that several scholars from al-Azhar sent several 
letters to newspapers and to him discussing their views against the book. 
B. Senior ‘ulama’s accusations against Rāziq: 
In 1925, Rāziq published a book that was controversial amongst Egypt's intellectuals, including the 
Council of Senior 'Ulama' of al-Azhar who accused Rāziq of contradicting Islam and the texts of the Holy 
Qur'an. The Council's accusations can be organized to seven categories. The first category was that 
Rāziq portrayed the Shari ‘a as an exclusive spiritual legislation with no affiliation to government or 
administrative matters. The second category was that Rāziq held that the jihad was ordered for the sake 
of kingship and not for the sake of spreading Islam to the world. The third category was that Rāziq 
believed that the system of governance was ambiguous, mysterious, inconsistent, incomplete, and 
perplexing. The fourth category was that Rāziq insisted that the Prophet's mission was to convey 
the Shari ‘a without governance or administration. The fifth category was that Rāziq challenged the 
inherent consensus amongst the Prophet's companions of appointing an imam who managed the 
religious and worldly affairs of the umma. The sixth category was that Rāziq explicitly denied the fact that 
a qaḍā' or judiciary authority is required by the Shari ‘a. Finally Rāziq asserted that the government of the 
first caliph and subsequent caliphs were secular, lā diniyya'.
130
  
As a result of Rāziq’s views, the senior of ‘ulama were moved to act against him. On August 12, 1925, the 
Council of Senior ‘ulama of al-Azhar issued its decision on Rāziq. The Council’s decision includes 
dismissing Rāziq from the body of the’ ulama and from his job as a judge in the Shari ‘a Courts.
131
  
Unlike Rāziq who ignored the Caliphate in the Qur’an, Sunna, ijmā‘ and in reasoning, for Sanhūrī  the 
Caliphate is based on ijmā‘ and in reasoning. 
C. Caliphate in Sanhūrī’s legal thought: 
For Sanhūrī,
132
 the Caliphate is necessary as it is Fard Kifāyah in Shari ‘a. He wrote his doctoral thesis at 
the University of Lyon entitled Le Califat, évolution vers une société des nations oriental which was 
published in 1926. Sanhūrī’s views on the Caliphate were totally different from Rāziq’s ideas. The aim of 
Sanhūrī’s thesis was to reestablish the Caliphate al-Khilāfa al-sahīha; but he concluded that if it is 
impossible to reestablish al-Khilāfa al-sahīha, so there is no excuse for establishing al-Khilāfa al-nāqysa. 
According to Sanhūrī, there are two types of the Caliphate. The first caliphate is al-Khilāfa al-sahīha which 
must reflect the Sunna conditions, and is chosen by voluntary allegiance. The second Caliphate which is 
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the al-Khilāfa al-nāqysa whereby the caliph who does meet not have all the required conditions or was 
chosen by voluntary allegiance, but gaining the power by sheer coercion. 
1. Ijmā‘ between religious doctrines: 
Sanhūrī ’s first argument concerning the Caliphate is based on the ijmā‘ between the Sunnis and the 
Mu'tazilites. 
a) Sunnis: 
The Sunnis insure the obligation of the Caliphate based on an incident. Following the Prophet’s 
death in 632, the companions of the Prophet agreed quickly to hire one amongst them to be the 
caliph in order to lead the Islamic community. According to Sanhūrī, if there had been a dispute 
amongst Muhājerūn, Ansār and Muslims, that dispute regarded the person who would be caliph, 
not on the necessity of the position itself.
133
  
b) Mu'tazilites: 
Unlike the Sunnis whose argument’s concerning the Caliphate on an incident, The Mu'tazilites’s 
argument concerning the Caliphate is based on reasoning. The Mu'tazilites used reasoning to 
come up with what is good and bad. The Mu'tazilites argue that the Caliphate is necessary in 
Shari ‘a in order to stabilize the society and manage its affaires.
134
 For them, the Caliphate is 
important to present anarchy. Sanhūrī agreed with the Mu'tazilites’s argument claiming that by 
depending on reasons, it could be said the government is a must in order to prevent chaos, by 
depending on the ijmā‘, it could be said the Caliphate is necessary in Islam.
135
 As we see 
Sanhūrī’’s belief on the Caliphate based on the ijmā‘ and in reasoning, the following is Sanhūrī ’s 
criticism of Rāziq’s ideas. 
2. Sanhūrī’s response to Rāziq: 
For Sanhūrī, the Caliphate is obligatory in Shari ’a based on the consensus between the religious 
doctrines. For Sanhūrī, the Prophetic government was not like the following governments, but it 
had the main conditions of the other governments like enforcing taxes.
136
 Sanhūrī responded to 
Rāziq’s ideas on two points. First, Sanhūrī contended that Rāziq did not differentiate between the 
obligation of the Caliphate and the hiring of the caliph as Sanhūrī demanded differentiate on 
between these two issues. The necessity of the Caliphate was agreed up on by Muslims after the 
Prophet’s death.
137
 Regarding the use of coercion, Sanhūrī behind that happened in all 
empires.
138
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In addition, Sanhūrī focused on Rāziq’ use of the two terms Religion and State, which means that 
the state has three bodies, executive, legislative and judicial body, and the religion represents the 
rules which are related to the person’s belief and his/her relationship with God. Sanhūrī 
contended that these two terms were not clearly defined during the Prophet’s lifetime as the 
political system depended on religious considerations or Shari ’a. The system of the state during 
the Prophet’s lifetime did not allow the existence of an accurate complex regime, whether 
Republic, Democratic or Autocratic. Even though, the Prophet organized the Islamic state with the 
basics features of states like enforcing taxes, laws, military and administrative system as civil 
system.
139
For Sanhūrī a government regardless of its form is necessary for the society; but by the 
ijmā‘, the Islamic government is a Fard- Kifāyah for Muslims. 
3. Reestablishment of the Caliphate: 
It is clear that Sanhūrī  insisted of the reestablishment of the Caliphate, after writing his thesis in 
1925, in 1929 Sanhūrī once again wrote his ideas to reestablish the Caliphate in al-Mohamā al-
shar’īya. He argued that the Islamic government has more advantages than any other governmental 
systems because al-Khilāfa al-sahiha has three important characteristics. First, the caliph is 
responsible for the religious and worldly affairs of Muslims.  Second, the caliph must implement Shari 
‘a as he is not enforced to implement the rule of a certain doctrine; he can ask the Mujtahidun to 
agree on a certain issue if there is a dispute. Third, the Caliphate is significant because it unites 
Muslims. The Islamic government must be based on only one caliph, which is al-Khilāfa al-sahīha , 
but Muslims might hire several caliphs if there is an excuse, which is called al-Khilāfa al-nāqysa . 
Hence, what matters for Sanhūrī is the implementation of Shari ’a through the Caliphate. 
D. Caliphate debate from 1940s to 1970s: 
After al-Azhar withdrew Rāziq’s certificate ‘ālim in 1925, twenty years later the Council of Senior ‘ulama of 
al-Azhar reinstated Rāziq the title ‘ālim in 1945, and from 1948 to 1949, he served as a Minister of al-
Awqāf or Religious Endowments. The period between1940 to 1970 is characterized by the lack 
controversy of the Caliphate debate unlike the previous period which was characterized by the heated 
debate of the Caliphate. After the heated debate on the Caliphate from 1920s to 1940s, the level of 
debate began to decrease between the 1950s to 1960s for several reasons. The first reason is because 
the Islamic society was flooded by anti-colonial sentiment by the 1950s. For example, the British 
colonization used all the means to evaporate the institutions of Islamic culture and society. They started 
by Shari ‘a. They limited its types of punishments. In addition, they switched Arabic with English as the 
administrative language and establishing Koranic and Arabic schools into their administrative 
framework.
140
 Additionally, most of the Muslim states gained independence during the 1950s, except 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 AL-MāWARDī, AHKāM SULTāNIYA 3 (1989). 
138
 Supra note 91, at 67-77. 
139
 Supra note 91, at 82-83. 
140
  BENJAMIN F. SOARES, MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN ENCOUNTERS IN AFRICA 223 (2006). 
 
 
19 
Algeria which gained its independence by 1962.
141
 Consequently, during that time, the Islamist could not 
have the power to call for the Caliphate during the colonization as I mentioned above the colonization 
aimed to not apply Shari ‘a. 
The second reason is because, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Muslim community like Egypt, Sudan, Libya, 
Syria and Iraq
142
 were flooded by nationalistic ideology and pan-Arabism whish was considered strongly 
secular. 
143
 Islam was seen as a burden to the evolution of the society. 
144
Pan-Arabism and Secular 
nationalist tried to strictly regulate religion and then use it to provide support for their causes, because of 
the power of Islam and its ability to mobilize the masses.
145
 For example, President Gamāl ‘Abd al-Nāsser 
attempted to do this by making al-Azhar dependent on the government then had it lend support to all 
governmental policies.
146
 Another reason was when President Nasser was a member of the military coup 
against King Farouk. Although the members of the Muslim Brotherhood took the side Nāsser side in that 
military coup, Nāsser repressed its expectations that victory might establish an Islamic government, and 
he moved to a secular socialist ideology.
147
As a result of this, when the Muslim Brotherhood participated 
in active opposition, Nasser repressed it.  Thousands were arrested during this time, such as Sayd Qutb, 
one of the prominent figures of the Muslim brotherhood; he was their leader between the 1950s and the 
1960s – who was executed.
148
 Nasser’s server’s repression of Islamic groups several of the Islamists as 
they were afraid of being arrested or tortured. 
As we see the debate between Rāziq and Sanhūrī in the 1920s, and its disappearance in the 1950s to 
1970s a period which was characterized  by colonization of the Arab states and Nasser’s repression, 
What follows is the return to the debate from the 1980s to 2014. Followed by the controversy between 
Muhammed ‘Imāra and Hāmyd Abū Zayd on Rāziq’s book followed by their thoughts on the Caliphate. 
This is followed by the arguments of Hasan al-Banā as the representative of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ibn 
Taymiyya as one of the representatives of the Salafists and ISIS on the Caliphate issue.  
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VI. Persistence of the Caliphate debate from 1970s to 2014: 
Two reasons can be argued of the return of the Caliphate debate from 1970s to 2014. In 1970s President 
Sadat made a deal with the Islamists in order to legitimize his rule. The deal was based on giving Muslim 
brotherhood more freedom like excluding them from prisons in order to combat the Leftist, Nāsser’s 
supporters. By 1972, President Sadat was under pressure by the Islamists movement for Islamizing 
Egypt. As the Muslim brotherhood became free; they started in calling people of their project, al- Banā’s 
project, including the establishment of the Caliphate and implementing Shari ‘a penalties. Another reason 
was that when Muslims were disappointed with their loose in the 1967 war; they asked themselves what 
has gone wrong with Islam? They found the answer which was Islam did not leave Muslims, but Muslims 
who abandoned Islam. Muslims must return to the right path of Islam, which was in the seventh century.  
The Muslim Brotherhood exploited this period of Muslims’ frustration and started converting their ideas 
including the establishment of the Caliphate through several means lectures, mosques, lessons and 
media.
149
 As we see the reasons why the debate returned between the 1970s and the 1980s, the 
following chapter starts with ‘Imāra’s counter argument to Rāziq’s book in 1970s and 1980s then his 
thinking on the Caliphate. ‘Imāra strongly believed and agreed on the implementation of the Caliphate. 
This is followed by Abū Zayd’s response to ‘Imāra concluding that ‘Imāra has a very contradictory view of 
Rāziq’s book and his thinking on the Caliphate which he believed that the Caliphate had no foundations in 
Shari ‘a. Followed by the beliefs of the Brotherhood, Salafists and ISIS whom believe in the Caliphate and 
call for its restoration. 
A. Caliphate in Muhammed ‘Imāra’s legal thought:  
 ‘Imāra articulated his thoughts in his book entitles al-Khilāfa; he considered the Caliphate to be 
necessary because it implements Shari ’a and unites Muslims. This chapter starts with ‘Imāra’s counter 
argument to Rāziq’s book then his thought on the Caliphate. 
 The main argument of the defenders of Rāziq is that his book was an attack on the desires of King Fūād 
and the imperialist ambitions of the British. This opinion is similar to ‘Imāra’s opinion. ‘Imāra,
150
 published 
Rāziq’s book in 1971. Later he wrote an introduction to the republication of the book in 1972,
151
  
discussing his support to the book, although he did not agree with it intellectually. For ‘Imāra the book 
was neither a political nor a religious academic. First, it was a political attempt to not let King Fārūk be the 
caliph; additionally, the book was a factor in excluding the English colonists from Egypt ‘Imāra argued.
152
. 
‘Imāra believed that the trial of Rāziq took place at the instigation of the king. ‘Imāra argued that the 
King’s Palace is responsible to push al-Azhar to act against Rāziq. ‘Imāra was confused with the decision 
of the Council of al-Azhar on Rāziq he argued that after 20 years of al-Azhar decision on Rāziq Rāziq was 
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once again restored the degree of ‘ālim. ‘Imāra wondered, by Rāziq’s receiving again his certificate, is 
that mean that al-Azhar believed in Rāziq’s thinking and realized they did a mistake by judging him? 
By the end of the 1980s and during the 1990s, ‘Imāra changed his opinion on ‘Rāziq’s book. Unlike his 
argument in the 1970s stating that Rāziq’s book helped to expel the English colonization in Egypt and 
from the Caliphate conspiracy in Egypt,
153
 among his general changes in his thoughts is becoming one of 
the people calling for the establishment of the Caliphate.
154
 ‘Imāra showed his growing discontent with 
Rāziq’s ideas in several ways. It began with published seven articles in al-Sha‘b, between 1, November 
1994 to 1, Februrary,1994. ‘Imāra discussed his points of view regarding the reasons why he was against 
Rāziq’s book. ‘Imāra argued that the book helped to achieve the West‘s goal in abolishing the Caliphate; 
the book’s aim is to secularize the Islamic society.  
The second way ‘Imāra developed a hypothesis regarding who was the actual author of Al-Islām wa Uṣūl 
al-Ḥukm. Before proving ‘Imāra’s hypothesis, he argued that Rāziq rejected his ideas of the book 
because he kept silent on discussing anything related to the book after the decision of the Council of al-
Azhar, and he refused to republish the book until he died in 1966. For ‘Imāra, this meant that Rāziq is not 
the only author of the book. 
‘Imāra rejected the hypothesis that the book was written by an Orientalist because he believed none of 
them supported such ideas about the Caliphate.
155
 ‘Imāra’s hypothesis was that Al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-
Ḥukm was written by two authors, Rāziq and Taha Husayn. ‘Imāra supported his hypothesis by using on 
Shaykh Ahmad Hasan’s report who claimed that Rāziq told him that the book was written by Taha 
Husayn and he surprised Rāziq by writing Rāziq’s name as the author on the book. Rāziq’s ethics 
prevented him from suing his friend Taha Husayn. ‘Imāra argued that he did not agree strongly with this 
argument; however, he provided other evidence proving that Taha Husayn wrote some parts of the book. 
‘Imāra quoted that Taha Husayn who said that he read the book three times before its publication and 
made several modifications.
156
 This is how ‘Imāra supported his contentions that the book was 
partnership of Rāziq and Taha Husayn and could not only have been written by Taha Husayn. ‘Imāra 
argued the first chapter of the book was written by Rāziq and could not have been written by Taha 
Husayn because such condemnations contradict Taha Husayn’s writings about the Caliphate. In his Al-
Fitna al-Kubrā, Taha Husayn gave a fair discussion of the Caliphate. Taha Husayn argued that the 
Caliphate was a contract between the Muslims and the caliph. Moreover, Taha Husayn did not accept the 
idea that the Caliphate was a theocratic system.
157
  
Unlike the first chapter which is written by Rāziq, ‘Imāra argued that the second chapter was written by 
Taha Husayn and not Rāziq because it discussed Islam as being religion and not a state and Islam had 
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nothing to do with politics, which was Taha Husayn’s ideas in his writings. 
158
 ‘Imāra added that the 
difference in writing the footnotes and the way of referring to Koranic chapters and verses proved that the 
book was written by more than one author. 
159
 As we see ‘Imāra’s counter argument to Rāziq’s book, 
what follows is ‘Imāra’s thinking on the Caliphate in the 1980s. 
 For ‘Imāra, the Caliphate is a civil system. It is the umma who hires, monitors, and deposes the caliph in 
urgent cases; the Caliphate’s aim is to implement Shari ‘a.
160
 According to ‘Imāra, for the first time, the 
Caliphate is the only type of government that involves three authorities, Shari ‘a, umma and the state,
161
 
which is considered a better governmental system than the autocratic and secular systems as it protects 
Islam and safeguards the society with its implementing of Shari ‘a.
162
  
Although ‘Imāra argued that all the Caliphates had fallen and risen, for more than thirteen centuries, all of 
them achieved several goals, which are considered the most important goals of Shari ‘a and society, he 
did not state enough evidences to insure this point . ‘Imāra claimed that the first goal that the Caliphate 
achieved was the unity of the umma, which is a goal stated in the Qur’an.
163
 The second goal is that the 
Caliphate achieved was the unity of dār al-Islām, or the Islam territory, which means all regions and 
homelands were under the control of the Islamic government. According to ‘Imāra, during the Caliphate 
there were no borders between the states. Every citizen was free to travel without getting a visa; 
however, the borders between the states, and the nationality system created by the European state are 
against Shari ‘a, in which citizens are unable to travel freely.
164
 The last goal achieved by the Caliphate 
was the implementation of Shari ‘a for Muslims and non-Muslims.
165
 Shari ‘a was applied on Muslims; it 
was considered the reference of the law. Shari ‘a allowed Non-Muslims the freedom of belief. 
As we see ‘Imāra’s counter argument to Rāziq’s book in the 1970s and 1980s and his aim is to implement 
the Caliphate because it applies Shari ‘a and has several advantages that make it a unique government 
to ‘Imāra, the following is a response of Abū  Zayd to ‘Imāra’s ideas on Rāziq’s book concerning Rāziq’s 
book and his legal thought on the Caliphate. Unlike ‘Imāra who believed in the Caliphate as it applies the 
goals of Shari ‘a, Abū Zyad ignored the Caliphate in the Qur’an and Sunna. 
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B. Caliphate in Nasr Hāmyd Abū Zayd’s legal thought: 
Abū Zayd
166
’s thinking regarding the Caliphate was ignored in the first two sources of Shari ‘a. Abū Zayd 
criticized ‘Imāra for his criticism of Rāziq’s ideas. The first point that Abū Zayd responded to ‘Imāra was 
that ‘Imāra’s criticism that Rāziq did not reject the ideas written in the book. Rāziq kept silent on 
discussing any ideas regarding his book because he wanted to avoid any further battles. Rāziq did not 
refuse to republish his book again; he told to Mahmūd Amīr al-ālim to publish the book if he wanted but 
without taking his permission; he stated I do not want to be responsible for that.
167
  
The second point that Abū Zayd responded to ‘Imāra was that the book written by both Rāziq and Taha 
Husayn. Abū Zayd argued that it was understandable if Taha Husayn had said he read the book three 
times before its publication and made several modifications.
168
In the intellectual field, it is normal that 
every author provides his/her book to others in order to be revised before its publication as any 
suggestions or modifications could help the author.
169
 Additionally, Abū Zayd rejected the idea that the 
book was written by Rāziq and Taha Husayn as questioned, why Taha Husayn did not take any action 
when Rāziq was faced a lot of troubles? Why Rāziq suffered alone without disclosing that Taha Husayn 
was the author too? As we see Abū Zayd’s response to ‘Imāra for his criticism of Rāziq’s book; what 
follows my response to ‘Imāra’s criticism of Rāziq’s book the 1990s in three points as I take the side of 
Abū Zayd followed by Abū Zayd’s view on the Caliphate.  
 The first point I disagree with ‘Imāra, is that, I believe Rāziq’s book did not aim to achieve the British’s 
goal for falling down the caliphate as ‘Imāra stated. Indeed, there was an agreement between the British 
and the palace to nominate king Fūād as a caliph for Muslims after Atātūrk ’s decision in abolishing the 
caliphate.
170
  
The second point, which is unlike ‘Imāra, is that Rāziq did not deny his ideas in the book. Like Abū Zayd 
claimed, in June 1966 before Rāziq’s death, Mahmūd Amīn al-‘Ālim met Rāziq in order to take his 
permission to republish his book. Rāziq was eager in insuring that he did not deny about anything of his 
ideas in the book.
171
Regarding the republishing of the book, Rāziq responded that he already faced a lot 
of problems because of the book, and he could not bear additional harms. Rāziq said to al- ‘ālim, 
republish the book on your responsibility and do not ask me for permission.
172
In addition, in November 
1971 al-Tali’a published Rāziq’s book. Al-Tali’a stated in its introduction, that Rāziq wanted in his last 
time, before his death to reprint again his book. In addition, when many people said that Rāziq denied his 
arguments, Rāziq’s daughter Dr. Souad Ali ‘Abdel Rāziq ignored that argument and said if my father 
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denied his arguments on the book, he would have the courage to face people of his regression and to 
publish his new argument”.
173
  
In addition, in November 7, 1989, ‘Imāra insured that after few years of Rāziq’s death Dār al-Helāl thought 
of publishing Rāziq’s book, and it sent  ‘Imāra to contact Rāziq’s successors to take their permission to 
publish the book.
174
 According to ‘Imāra, he met Rāziq’s oldest son, Muhammed and he asked him if Dār 
al-Helāl could republish the book. Muhammed told ‘Imāra that before a short time of Rāziq’s death, he 
was under the pressure of many people to publish the book, so he started writing a new introduction to 
the book which does not reflect any new intellectual position and it discussed the circumstances of 
publishing the book. According to Muhammed, his father wrote three pages then he died, and we lost 
those three pages. 
175
 Consequently, according to the stated facts, Rāziq did not deny his arguments and 
he agreed to publish his book with the same views. 
 
Moreover, during the conversation of Sheikh Musalaem and Rāziq in 1942, Rāziq argued that he did not 
acknowledge that Taha Husayn is the author because based on his customs; the youngers cannot 
contradict what the older people say. This is sentence is questionable how Rāziq said this sentence and it 
is well known that Rāziq is older than Taha Husayn. Rāziq was born in 1887 and Taha Husayn was born 
in 1889. This means that Rāziq’s response to Sheikh Musalaem is doubtable. Additionally, Rāziq’s 
response to sheikh Mussalam as Taha Husayn surprised him by writing his name is questionable. How 
Rāziq was surprised by the book and his memorandum before the trial insured that he knew well what 
had been written in the book. He wrote the memorandum responding to the seven accusations. He said 
to the council, I wrote the memorandum and I am ready to discuss it verbally if you want. Additionally, his 
responses in the memorandum assured that he was aware of what had been written in the book. For 
example responding to the first accusation, Rāziq considered Shari ‘a as purely spiritual; and it has no 
relation with the authority. Rāziq responded that he did not believe in that, Shari’ a is purely spiritual. He 
responded I have not said this in the book or in anything else. Consequently, based on this response, it is 
clear that Rāziq knew well what had and had not been written in the book. 
 Lastly, I wonder how Rāziq was surprised by the book according to the conversation of Rāziq and 
Mussalem, and the introduction of the book insures that Rāziq is the author. Rāziq wrote, I have been 
hired in the Egyptian Shari’a court since thirty three thousand three hundred Hijri 1915, and this 
encourages me in researching in all kinds of the history of the legitimate judiciary  and the judiciary , and 
because the legitimate judiciary is one of the branches of the Islamic government, anyone wants to 
research in this kind of judiciary has to start researching in its first branch which is the government in 
Islam and the basis of any authority in Islam is the caliphate and the Imam, so it was important to do 
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research in it. I have been started researching for several years, and I am still in my early stage of the 
research. Here is my research I provide for the person who might be interested.  
Hence, according to the stated facts, Rāziq is considered the author of the book, he did not deny any 
ideas related to the book and he did not use the book for falling down the caliphate. As a result, what 
‘Imāra said is invalid. As we see, ‘Imāra’s criticism of Rāziq’s book in the 1990s is not logic. I take the side 
of Abū Zayd in supporting Rāziq’s book. What follows is Abū Zayd’s legal thought regarding the Caliphate 
as his ideas are similar to Rāziq. Like Rāziq, in Abū Zayd’s eyes, the Caliphate had no foundations in the 
Qur’an and Sunna. 
a) Caliphate in the Qur’an and Sunna: 
Abū Zayd argued that the Caliphate was ignored in both the Qur’an and the Sunna; according to him, the 
negotiations between Muslims, Ansār ,
176
and Muhajirūn,
177
about the Caliphate following the death of the 
Prophet was the eligibility and not on Shari ‘a sources.
178
 Abū Zayd argued that after the Prophet’s death, 
Abū Bakr, ‘Umar Ibn Al-khatāb, the Muhajirūn, and the Ansār , met in order to discuss who would be the 
Prophet’s successor after his death. On one hand, the Ansār contended that they had the priority on the 
Caliphate because they had helped and supported the Muhajirūn.
179
 On the other hand, ‘Alī discussed 
that he has the eligibility to be the caliph as he is the Prophet’s cousin and to continue the victories by 
Banū Hāshem against their enemies. 
180
 Abū Zayd concluded that the above story proved that there was 
a separation among the people on the Caliphate issue, and that conflict proved there was nothing in the 
Qur’an or Sunna stating that the caliph must be Quryashī or the other obligation of the Caliphate. Abū 
Zayd believed that verses depended on to identify the Caliph were created during the fight of sfīn 
between ‘Alī and Mu‘áūya. When Mu‘áūya became the caliph, the Umayyad empire had to create fatwā 
proving the legitimacy and eligibility of its empire Qurayshī‘ in order to face fatwā  by the Shias stating the 
legitimacy of fighting the Umayyad empire.
181
 
b) Choosing the rightly guided caliphs: 
For Abū Zayd, the way of choosing the rightly guided caliphs was not based on the original allegiance 
meaning. Abū Zayd argued that the eventual agreement the first four caliphs was not based on 
unanimous consensus. Muslims agreed on Abū Bakr six months after his appointment. 
182
 After the death 
of Abū Bakr, Muslims had to have a new caliph, who was ‘Umar Ibn al-khatāb, who became the second 
caliph after the negotiation of only two of the Prophet’s companions: ‘Abd al-Rahmān Ibn ‘Khūf and 
‘Uthmān Ibn ‘Afān; additionally, Abū Bakr gave the license to ‘Uthamān to be the caliph in case al-khatāb 
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rejected it.
183
 ‘Uthamān Ibn ‘Afān became the third caliph after the death of Omar Ibn al- khatāb and his 
choice was based on a Shūra Council composed of six of the Prophet’s companions hired by the second 
caliph; lastly, the choosing of Ali was not based totally on unanimous consensus as the people who gave 
him the oath of the allegiance were the same people who had waged a war against him.
184
  
Abū Zayd concluded that the selection of every caliph was not based on unanimous consensus, a vote of 
allegiance could be one or two, and following this decision, Muslims have to obey the caliph. 
The Caliphate ideology of ‘Imāra and Abū Zayd is different as ‘Imāra supported the Caliphate as it is a 
unique institution and has many advantages. While Abū Zayd ignored the Caliphate in the first and 
second sources in Shari ‘a. The next part is the Caliphate in the legal thought of the Muslim Brotherhood 
as I present the arguments of Hasan al- Banā as he is their representatives and the founder of the 
organization. Al-Banā inspired hundreds of thousands of Muslims around the world. Al- Banā concluded 
that the Islamic government is the best type of government, and he laid down some principles and 
features of that government in order to achieve justice. This is followed by the legal thought of Ibn 
Taymiyya as hundreds of Salafists are influenced by him; for Ibn Taymiyya, any society must have a 
government to organize and manage its legal affairs whether its ruler is ruling justly or unjustly. 
Furthermore, for him, whether the Caliphate is Khilāfat al-nubuwwa or Khilāfat al-mulk it is still legitimate. 
The last section discusses, the official spokesman of ISIS proclaiming the establishment of the Caliphate 
with over all Muslims with, Al-Baghdādī as caliph.  
C. The period after the 25
th
Janurary revolution: 
The Caliphate was debatable after the 25
th
 January revolution for a main reason. The reason was that 
after the revolution, many political parties were incorporated. For example, the liberty and justice political 
party as it represents the Muslim Brotherhood’s thought, the Nour political party as it represents the 
Salafists’s thought, and the Dustūr political party as it represents the liberals’ thoughts. The Islamic 
political parties, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists have the same ideology which is the calling for 
the reestablishment of the caliphate and the implementation of Shari ’a, so like the period of the 1970s, 
the Islamists were calling for it through many ways like lecture, lesson or Media. 
1. Caliphate in the Muslim Brotherhood’s legal thought: 
Like ‘Imāra, the Caliphate in the Muslim Brotherhood’s thinking is characterized mainly by the application 
of Shari ’a. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banā; the main goal of the 
incorporation of this group is the establishment of the Caliphate, the implementation of Shari ‘a and the 
liberation from colonization.
185
 Al-Banā’s project influenced thousands of Muslims worldwide in order to 
reinforce the society through Islam. In 1949 he was assassinated after a series of murders committed by 
members of his organization. 
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Al-Banā was born in Mahmūdiyya, Egypt in 1906; when he was eight year old, he studied for four years 
subjects like history, the Qur’an and literature at a school there.
186
 Al-Banā participated in demonstrations 
against the British rule when he was between fourteen and seventeen year old.
187
 He moved to Cairo at 
Dar al ‘Ulūm for teacher training; then he moved to Isma’ilya where he worked as a professor in a 
school.
188
 
Al-Banā was influenced mostly by Rashīd Ridā, who depended on ijtihād
189
, which is contrary to the 
Salafism discourse which rejected it. Al-Banā followed Rashīd Ridā’s writings in AL-Manār magazine and 
shared Ridā’s concern on the abolition of the Caliphate.
190
Like all Islamists, al-Banā considered the 
government as a fundamental part of Islam; it was a must that Shari ‘a be implemented, which mean 
following the model of the Prophet and his companions as the rightly guided caliphs. For al-Banā, Islam is 
defined as the non-separation between the state and religion;
191
 he depended on the Koranic verses to 
insure that the Islamic Caliphate was based on three necessary principles: justice,
192
 between Muslims 
and non-Muslims, liberty 
193
and jīhad.
194
 Al- Banā wrote an article on had,
195
 supporting with some verses 
in the Qur’an and Hadiths and the ideas of the four of the classical schools of Sunni jurisprudence on 
jihad. He insured that Jihad is against polytheists, and everyone who does not embrace Islam.
196
 He 
added that it is a must to fight with people who do not embrace Islam even if those people do not fight 
against Muslims. 
197
 According to al-Banā, Jews and Christians are obliged to pay the jizya,
198
 as it is 
mentioned in the Qur’an
199
.Additionally, al-Banā argued that the jihad becomes fard ‘Ayn for all Muslims if 
Islamic lands are occupied.
200
 This meant that every Muslim whether male or female has to join or at least 
help the fighter. 
201
 
Additionally, like ‘Imāra, al-Banā laid down three features on the Islamic Caliphate. The first feature was 
that the Caliphate is a message,
202
 which means al-Bana supported the idea of the non-separation 
between the state and religion, unlike Rāziq’s view. Like ‘Imāra, the second feature was that the 
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Caliphate is international, which means the Caliphate’s role is to unite Muslims and to expand the 
boarders of the Islamic state by Jihad,
203
 and lastly like ‘Imāra, the Caliphate must function according to 
the Qur’an, 
204
 this meant the Caliphate’s aim is implementing Shari ’a. 
In addition to the three features mentioned above, al-Banā imposed three categories for the Islamic 
government. The first category was that the ruler’s responsibility as he is responsible to God and People; 
the ruler is considered to be a servant of the people. The relationship between the ruler and the citizens is 
contractual; the authority cannot be inherited, which means the authority must be based on election and 
the umma is the only one who choose the caliph. 
205
 The second category was that that al-Banā argued 
that the Muslim nation must act in a unified manner. He based this argument on two points. First, the 
citizens must provide advice and guidance for the Islamic state.
206
 This meant the umma had a duty 
toward the caliph. The citizens must monitor him and guide him in case he misused the authority. Al-Banā 
added the ruler could not be removed unless he disobeyed God’s mandate. 
207
 Here, al-Banā did not 
mention what were the acts that allowed the umma to dispose the caliph. Second, contrary to the 
western’s democracy system, al-Banā rejected the multiparty systems because it breaks the unity of the 
Muslim nation and creates a competition between the political parties to gain the authority.
208
 The third 
category was that al-Banā strongly supported that the best working system is the unitary system in order 
to achieve both the reformation of the government and independence. 
209
 According to al-Banā, if the 
government met the above three conditions, its name or form does not matter; he argued that the 
contemporary political systems and parliamentary democracy is the closest to Islam.
210
  Although al-Banā 
rejected the multiparty system which is considered as democratic. 
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As we see, like ‘Imāra and Sanhūrī the legal thought of al-Banā  on the Caliphate was characterized by 
the unity of the umma and the application of Shari ’a. What follows is the Caliphate in Ibn Taymiiya’s legal 
thought regarding the Caliphate. For Ibn Taymiyya, the most important issues are the implementation of 
Shari ’a like ‘Imāra and al-Banā claimed and the existence of a government as he was scared from 
anarchy. 
2. Caliphate in the Salafists legal thought: 
The Caliphate in the legal thought of Ibn Taymiyya was characterized by the implementation of Shari ’a 
like ‘Imāra, Sanhūrī and al-Banā, and the obligation of existence a government scaring from anarchy. Ibn 
Taymiyya was born after the fall of Baghdad, in Harran. His family moved to Damascus when he was 
about six year old, and was educated there in the religious sciences and Sunna.
211
 Ibn Taymiyya was a 
member of the Hānbalī school of law created by the students of Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, who depended on the 
first two sources of Shari ‘a, the Qur’an and Sunna, instead of depending on ijtihād. Following the death 
of his father, Ibn Taymiyya became a professor of Hanbalī jurisprudence in the Grand Mosque. 
Ibn Taymiyya was a Salafist; he called and supported the Salafism discourse, which depends mainly on 
the Qur’an and hadiths. However, it rejects ijma’, qyās and ijtihād as it involves reason, which should not 
play any roles in religious matters.
212
 Ibn Taymiyya reconnected the umma back to Salaf from 400 H to 
700 when Ahl-al-Kalām severed the umma from the righteous Salaf. This is proven in his writings like 
when he refuted the Raafidah, the Sufiyyah, the Jahmiyyah and all other factions or individuals.
213
 There -
are different opinions on Ibn Taymiyya’s arguments. The leader of al-Nūr political party Tárek al-Saharī 
who supports Ibn Taymiyya’s arguments criticizing ‘Alī Gom’a, the previous Mufftī’s opinion on Ibn 
Taymiyya when he said Gom’a said that the fatwā of Ibn Taymiyya are disaster.
214
 
In order to analyze Ibn Taymiyya’s opinions on the Caliphate, one must be familiar with the al-Siyasa al-
shar’iyya. Ibn Taymiyya discussed the issue of the Caliphate in a fatwā belonging to the Prophet claiming 
that “The Caliphate will last thirty years, and then it will turn into monarchy.” For Ibn Taymiyya, this meant 
that the caliphate would exist in every era. The first thirty years are the ideal governments. Then, all the 
subsequent caliphates were characterized by anarchy.  
 Additionally Ibn Taymiyya divided the Caliphate into two types: Khilāfat al-nubuwwa (Caliphate based on 
the model of the Prophetic government) and Khilāfat al-mulk (Caliphate based on kingship).
215
 Ibn 
Taymiyya placed the four caliphs under the head of Khilāfat al-nubuwwa; and all the subsequent caliphs 
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starting with Mu‘áūya under the head of Khilāfat al-mulk.
216
 Ibn Taymiyya did not consider the Caliphates 
after the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs as illegitimate; instead, he claimed “one may call Khilāfa those rulers 
also who came after the rightly guided caliphs even though they acted as kings and not as deputies of the 
Prophet,” and mentioned a Prophetic hadith: “The people of Israel were ruled by their prophets. 
Whenever a prophet died another prophet took his place. But there will be no prophet after me; there will 
only be deputies and there will be several.”
217
 Ibn Taymiyya argued that “The words, and they will be 
several, is evidence that the Prophet insured there would be few caliphs besides the rightly guided 
caliphs.”
218
  
Although Ibn Taymiyya argued that the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphate are not placed under the 
category of Khilāfat al-nubuwwa, he recognized their legitimate rules. For Ibn Taymiyya, the society may 
change Khilāfat al-nubuwwa
 
to Khilāfat al-mulk in two cases.
219
 The first case, if the society is not capable 
of implementing the Khilāfat al-nubuwwa, the ruler will have an excuse and will not be punished. The 
second case, if the society is capable of establishing Khilāfat al-nubuwwa
, 
so the ruler has a duty to 
establish, and if he ignored it, he is punished.
220
 Ibn Taymiyya’a research on the Caliphate represented 
the Caliphate as the perfect model for the Muslim community. For Ibn Taymiyya, if the Caliphate is an 
ideal form of government, the Shari ‘a for him is the highest authority that should be the guiding principle 
for Islamic Government. For Ibn Taymiyya, Shari ‘a is the legislative body of the government that 
controlling the society. For him, the Caliphate considered the best functioning government if it applied 
Shari ‘a. The book al-Siyasa al-shar’iyya is based on two verses in the Qur’an concerning political rule: 
“Surely God commands you to make over trusts to those worthy of them, and that when you 
Judge between people, you judge with justice. Surely God admonishes you with what is 
Excellent. Surely Allah is ever Hearing, Seeing.” 
“O you who believe, obey God and obey the Messenger and those in authority from among you; then if 
you quarrel about anything, refer It to God and the Messenger, if you believe in God and the Last Day. 
This is best and more Likely to (achieve) the end.”
221
 
In analyzing the previous versus, Ibn Taymiyya stressed that rulers should rule and administer the 
society’s legal affairs fairly.
222
 In that regard, it can be argued that according to Ibn Taymiyya, Shari ‘a’s 
definition is to ruling justly.
223
 This means that a ruler must judge according to Shari ’a, which means 
according to the Qur’an and the Sunna.”
224
 It can be argued that for Ibn Taymiyya the Qur’an and Sunna 
are the guiding law for Muslims. In al-Siyasa al-shar’iyya, there are several Hadiths of the Prophet 
ordering rulers to rule justly: 
 
“The most beloved in the eyes of God is the just ruler, and the most hateful in His eyes is 
the unjust ruler.” 
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“The people of Paradise are of three categories: a just ruler, a man good-natured towards 
every relative and every Muslim, and a man who is rich, chaste and charitable.” 
 
“So, the aim of sending messengers and revealing Books [scriptures] (to them) is to enable 
men to be fair in performing the duties due to God and those due to His creatures.”
225
 
To sum up, what is important for Ibn Taymiyya, is the rule according to Shari ‘a. Any ruler who rules justly 
is considered as a ruler who rules according to Shari ‘a. For Ibn Taymiyya, if the Caliphate could 
implement Shari ‘a, it would considered the ideal government. Ibn Taymiyya provided a Hadith claiming 
that: 
“Every one of you is a shepherd, and every one of you is responsible for his flock; the caliph who rules 
the people is a shepherd, and he is responsible for those whom he governs; the woman is a shepherdess 
in her husband’s house, and she is responsible for the household; the youngster is a shepherd in regard 
to his father’s wealth, and he is responsible for the money at his disposal; the slave is a shepherd as 
regards his master’s possessions, and he is responsible for these possessions. Lo! Every one of you is a 
shepherd, and every one of you is responsible for his flock.”
226
 
 
This meant that For Ibn Taymiya, the ruler and citizens are equal. In the above passage he equalized the 
caliph to a woman, youngster and even a shepherd. Consequently, based on Ibn Taymiyya’s view, good 
government is meant looking to the Shari ‘a for guidance, not the Caliphate.  
 
Although Ibn Taymiyya claimed the importance of a just ruler, he recognized that political authority is 
essential for political and social order whether the ruler is ruling justly or unjustly. Ibn Taymiyya expressed 
his concern for prevailing chaos, as evidenced by the following Hadith: 
 
“Sixty years of (domination) of a despotic ruler are better than one single night (passed) without a 
ruler.”
227
 
Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyya provided a report by the fourth caliph Ali in order to justify the political rule 
whether the ruler was fair or unfair:  
 
“Ali ibn Abi Talib said: “It is inevitable that there should be an authority, righteous or 
wicked.” He [cAli] was asked: “O Commander of the Faithful, we understand what a 
righteous authority is; what Abū ut the wicked?” He answered: “From this also the frontiers 
are guarded, the highways are rendered secure, the land is defended against the enemy and 
the fai’ (revenues from lands conquered from unbelievers) are distributed among the 
Muslims. “
228
 
Hence, according to Ibn Taymiyya, a government is a must in the society to prevent chaos. If the ruler 
was fair, his government would be ideal and legitimate and anarchy would prevented. However, if he ruler 
was unfair, his government would not be ideal; but legitimate as without it the society would not be 
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stabilized and chaos would prevail. As we see Ibn Taymiyya’s eyes on the Caliphate, what follows is a 
letter written by ISIS proclaiming the establishment of the Caliphate. 
3. Caliphate in The Islam State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) legal thought:  
Like Sanhūrī, ‘Imāra and Ibn Taymiyya who strongly supported the Caliphate as it applies Shari ’a, ISIS 
believes in the Caliphate too. They declared that they restore the Caliphate. ISIS began in Iraq with the 
name “Islam state of Iraq”, and then it expanded to Syria and changed its name to the Islam State of Iraq 
and Syria.
229
 At this time, ISIS controls parts in Syria and Iraq which is a part of a single state.
230
 ISIS is 
fighting in these two countries in order to achieve its main objective, which is expansion. 
After ISIS’s control of some parts in Syria and Iraq; they declared the restoration of the Caliphate. On the 
29 of June 2014, Abū Muhammad al-‘Adnānī, the official spokesman of ISIS, proclaimed the 
establishment of the Caliphate; he declared the group as a Caliphate and its leader is Abū Bakr al-
Baghdādī, the Caliph Ibrahim. The announcement came on the Twitter account of the group’s al-I’tisaam 
Media Foundation entitled”, الله دعو اذه”.
231
 The speech can be summarized in five points. The first point was 
that there is no excuse to delay the implementation of the Caliphate. The second point was that Ibrāhīm 
Ibn ‘Awwād Ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn ‘Alī Ibn Muhammad al-Badrī al-Hāshimī al-Husaynī al-Qurashī is the caliph of 
all Muslims , and he accepted the bay’ah (pledge of allegiance)  by the people of the authority in the 
Islamic state. The third point was that ISIS has expanded to in Iraq and Shām. The fourth point was that 
all Muslims have to give the oath of allegiance and support the caliph, al- Baghdādī. The last point was 
that any other groups or organizations become void after ISIS’s announcement of the Caliphate.
232
   
Responding to ISIS’s letter, first, the Caliphate cannot be applied in the 21th century. Every state has its 
own laws and customs that might be different from other states. For example, the incident of Charlie 
Hebdo insured that France allows without limitations the freedom of expression; the cartoonists can draw 
several caricatures underestimating any religion without being punished. However, customs in Egypt 
cannot allow such behavior. The same idea applies in the Caliphate issue. Surely not all the states could 
accept the project of ISIS including the establishment of the Caliphate as it differs from their laws and 
customs. Second, it is obvious that ISIS wanted to gain the power of the Caliphate by violence like the 
Umayyad and Abbasid. It proclaimed al- Baghdādī as a caliph without taking the allegiance from Muslims. 
The votes of the people of authority in the Islamic state were enough for them to choose the caliph, and 
following this decision, Muslims have to obey the caliph. In addition, ISIS killed thousands of people and 
captured Iraq and Sham in order to gain the power an attitude which is against Islam and the Prophet’s 
behavior. As we see ISIS’s thinking in the Caliphate, the following is a response to the Caliphate question 
through conducting a historical analysis of six Sunni scholars. 
                                                          
229
 Abdallah Suleiman Ali, ISIS on offense in Iraq, Al-Monitor, JUNE 10, 2014.  
230
 Id.  
231
 Translated into English to this is the Promise of Allah. 
232
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=waWxwanIdR2CA. 
 
 
 
33 
VII. Analysis: 
As we see, the thoughts of al-Banā, Ibn Taymiyya and ISIS in the Caliphate who were characterized by 
the implementation of Shari’ a, the following is a response to the Caliphate question through examining 
the thoughts of six Sunni scholars and ISIS in the Caliphate. Starting from the 1920s to 2014: In the 
1920s Rāziq’s and Sanhūrī ; then in the 1980s Abū Zayd and ‘Imāra and lastly the Caliphate debate 
following the 25
th
January revolution, the Muslim brotherhood as I examine the writings of al-Banā , the 
Salafists as I examine the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and ISIS’s letter. I hope that this thesis constitutes a 
useful starting point to support the separation idea of religion and politics; and gives an appropriate 
answer to the Caliphate question through examining the arguments of the all mentioned authors. 
An essential characteristic of Islam is that it ignores the formal separation of religion and politics. Unlike 
Secular countries, such as France, the separation idea of religion and politics is strongly acceptable. 
However, in Islam, religious and political authorities are inseparable. This is seen in the position of the 
caliph. The caliph has two roles: the first role is protecting the religion; and the second role is managing 
worldly affairs. The caliph’s freedom is limited; he is restricted to the guiding law in Shari ‘a. The caliph 
cannot allow something prohibited in Shari’ a or contradicts something ordered in Shari’ a. For example, 
when the Qur’an orders Muslims to do the five daily prayers, hence the caliph must follow this obligatory 
duty and enforces Muslims to do so as an order from God. In Bernard Lewis’s book “The Political 
Language of Islam,” he argues that unlike Christianity, which is characterized  by the separation of state 
and religion, Islam does not accept such idea as it contradicts its rules, “The distinction Between church 
and state, so deeply rooted in Christendom, did not exist in Islam….The very notion of a secular 
jurisdiction and authority—of a so-to-speak unsanctified Part of life that lies outside the scope of religious 
law and those who uphold it—is seen as an impiety, indeed as the ultimate betrayal of Islam.”
233
 
Additionally, Ann Lambton claims that Islam and Christianity are totally different. As Islam does not 
recognize the separation idea of state and church, while in Christianity, this idea is highly appreciated.
234
 
The idea that Islam is characterized by a rigid fusion of religion and politics is supported by several Arabic 
authors too like Khomeinī,
235
 the guide of the Iranian revolution, and Yusuf Qaradāwī. Qaradāwī claims 
that Christianity accepts the separation of life into two parts. The first part is for the religion; and the 
second part is for the state. Unlike Islam which ignores such idea.
236
 Both authors, Khomeinī and Yusuf 
Qaradāwī argue that the Islamic government is necessary as it applies Shari ‘a; they have an only 
concern that is without an Islamic government, there cannot be no implementation of Shari ‘a. As we see 
how the non-separation idea in Islam is supported by many scholars, the following is the views of the 
opponents and proponents of Rāziq’s book. 
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There are different views regarding the separation idea of religion and politics, which is supported in 
Rāziq’s book. On the one hand the work of Muhammad al-Khidr Husayn,
237
 Rashīd Ridā,
238
are 
considered two of the most popular books of Rāziq’s criticism. Rashīd Ridā claimed that Rāziq’s book 
allows Muslims to disobey God and the Prophet concerning all of the worldly regulations of the Shari 
’a.”
239
 Additionally, Shaykh Muhammad Bakhīt and the scholars of al-Azhar are critiques of Rāziq’s 
arguments too. All of them see the Caliphate is the ideal government because it applies the rule of law 
Shari ‘a. On the other hand, there are several authors who defend Rāziq’s work as Majid Fahmī Fakhrī 
who described Islam and the foundations of Political Power as” the most thoughtful and constructive 
attempt to re-examine the presuppositions upon which the traditional notion of the Islamic Sate rests.”
240
 
As well as Souad T. Ali who claims that Rāziq’s work is “new critical examination of Islam’s history and 
scared texts, is “is keeping with the active revivalist spirit of the early twentieth century Muslim world.”
241
 
Ali does not argue like Fakhrī that Rāziq’s proved the requirements of progress, but she argues that his 
work filled the conditions of responsible scholarship. Consequently, according to Ali, the decision of 
dismissing Rāziq’s from the Council of ‘ulama’’ was wrong as their decision was political not religious. 
242
  
 
Contrary to the idea that Islam is both religion and politics, this thesis argues the opposite; there is 
separation of religion and politics in Islam. This is seen in the examination of the thoughts of six Sunni 
scholars and ISIS in the Caliphate starting from the 1920s to 2014, which show that Rāziq and Abū Zayd 
have the same thinking regarding the Caliphate. While, Sanhūrī, ‘Imāra, al-Banā, Ibn Taymiyya and ISIS 
have the same though in the Caliphate. 
 
The separation view of religion and politics has been discussed extensively. In Ira Lapidus’s Article “The 
Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society,” which focuses on 
Baghadad, she argues that from the middle of the tenth century, governments in the Islamic lands were 
characterized with secular regime.
243
There were three developments in early Islam that reflect the 
separation of religion and politics. The first development was that the Muslim caliphs who strongly 
focused on the political authority instead of religious character; the second development was the 
appearance of a religious class ‘ulama who were independent of the political authority of the Caliphate, 
who were judges, teachers, administrators and the third development was the appearance of religious 
advisers to Muslim, and the rise of the Hanbalī school of law.
244
 Another author who supports the 
separation idea is Patricia Crone; she argues that although after the death of the Prophet, the political 
and religious authority was controlled by the caliph, by the mid-ninth century the ‘ulama declared that they 
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are the only who interpret the Qur’an and sunna,
245
 rejecting any intervention from any caliph in religious 
matters.
246
In addition, another proponent of the separation view is ‘Abdullahī Ahmed An-Na’khīm. He 
focuses on the reasons why secularism is a better system that the Islamic state for Muslims and claims 
that “It is Indispensable for protecting the freedom of each and every person to affirm, challenge, or 
transform his or her cultural or religious identity,”
247
  Additionally, Ashmawī, an Egyptian liberal lawyer, 
who is against the case of the fusion religion and politics too. He provides several conflicts in the political 
Islamic history and concluded that all these conflicts have been articulated in a religious manner which 
hides their bases political character. 
248
 After we see the proponents and the opponents of the separation 
idea of religion and politics, the following is a view arguing that the Qur’an states the appearance of a 
government without stating its form. Followed by proving that the Prophetic government was a theocratic 
government, and a legal one, not Islamic. 
 
A. Government in the Qur’an and the Prophet’s era: 
It is essential that everyone agrees that a government is important for any society regardless its religion, 
color or race. The view of Rāziq, Ibn Taymiyya and Sanhūrī that a government is a must in Islam to 
prevent chaos and to protect the society is persuasive. 
249
Indeed, a body of law is not enough to organize 
and to stabilize and manage a society. In order to prevent chaos, there must be a ruler and a 
government. Without these the society will be unstable and chaos will prevail.  I believe a government is 
necessary in Islam based on the Qur’an, but at the same time I believe the Qur’an does not articulate the 
form of government as Rāziq,
250
 and Abu Zayd,
251
claim. Unlike Sanhūrī, I believe that the political 
authority has no foundation in the Prophetic government as Rāziq argued.
252
 I believe the form of 
government during the period of the Prophet was a theocratic and a legal one. In the following paragraph 
I discuss that the Qur’an mentions the existence of a government but it does not articulate its form 
followed by my arguments on the non-existence of the political authority during the government of the 
Prophet.  
First of all, I believe that the Qur’an only states the existence of a government without articulating its form. 
The Qur’an states the existence of a government, but it does not mention the form of the government that 
has to be applied in the society. The Qur’an mentions two kinds of kings good kings like Jewish kings, 
David and Solmon who were appreciated by the Qur’an because they ruled justly, according to the divine 
law, and bad kings like Pharaoh,
253
 who was criticized in the Qur’an because he was a tyrant king; he did 
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not believe in The Prophet in Moses, who was the Prophet of Jews.
254
 The Qur’an describes Pharaoh as” 
a Kings, when they enter a country, they despoil it and make the noblest of its people meanest, thus do 
they behave.”
255
 Based on these mentioned verses, it is obvious that the Qur’an is not against the idea of 
kingship, which means it accepts the society having a ruler. However, the Qur’an does not state the form 
of government of such a kingship. The Qur’an is only against despotic rule which does not follow divine 
law.
256
 Hence, the Qur’an recognizes the existence of a ruler by stating the types of kings, but with one 
condition which is the rule just and according to divine law. In addition, the Qur’an uses several times the 
word al-Hukm to express authority.
257
 Thus, by using the word al-Hukm the Qur’an accepts the 
establishment of an authority to rule the society. In addition to the lack of stating directly the form of 
government, I believe political authority has no foundation during Prophetic government. Although the 
Prophetic government involved the three powers, legislative, executive and judicial bodies, the 
government of the Prophet was not characterized by political authority. 
The highest body of the Prophetic government is the legislative body which refers to the laws that apply in 
society; in democracy this authority is chosen by the umma or the citizens or their representatives like the 
parliament.
258
 However, in Islam the only legislator is God; God connects with people through his 
Prophets. He delivered his divine law, which is embodied in the Qur’an to the people.
259
 
There are many features of the Koranic legislation during the period of the Prophet. The first feature is 
that the Qur’an was established gradually over 22 years parallel to the progress of the Islamic state; 
therefore, the legislation was practical and the rules were limited.
260
 The second feature is that the Qur’an 
lays down the conditions to organize the religious issues,
261
 such as praying, equality and the freedom of 
belief. The third feature is that the Qur’an is universal.
262
 Because the Qur’an is from God, so it is for all 
people regardless their color, race or religion; it is not possible for anyone to amend or change it after the 
period of the Prophet.
263
 To sum up, the Prophet was not a ruler; the Qur’an is the ruler that creates the 
rules and the Prophet was only a Messenger from God to guide and educate the people the divine law. 
                                                          
254
 Qur’an, XX:43 
 XXVIII:4 
 LXXIX: 15-26. 
255
 ‘Alī, The Holy Qur'an, vol. 2, pp. 985-986. 
256
 HAMIDULLAH, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM 90-91 (1969). 
MUTW’ALī  , MABäda’, NIZāM AL-HUKM FI AL-ISLāM 498 (1st ed. 1966). 
257
 Qur'an, III: 79 
XII: 40 
XXI: 79 
 V: 42-50. 
258
 MUTW’ALī , AL- QANUN AL-DUSTURI WA AL-ANZIMAH AL-SIYASIYAH 160-164 (3
rd
 ed. 1964).  
259
 KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM, 24 (3
rd
 ed. 1962) 
260
 KHALāF, KHULāSAT TARīKH AL-TASHRIī’ AL-ISLāMī, 60-61 (8
TH
 ed. 1968). 
261
 AL- SHAFI’ī’ , AL-RISALAH, p. 20 (1
st
 ed. 1940). 
 SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 1 (1964).   
262
 Qur'an, XXI: 107 
 The holy Our'an  846 
Qur'an, XKXIV: 28 
PICKTHALL, Glorious Koran, p. 309. 
263
 Qur'an, X: 64;  
ūDAH, AL-TASHRī’ AL JINāī’19 (2
nd
 ed. 1959). 
 
 
37 
As we see the supreme body of the Prophetic government, the following is the second body of the 
Prophetic government.  
The second body is the executive power which was controlled by the Prophet’s representative of God and 
under his direct control as he was the God’s Messenger. The Prophet was the head of the executive 
power; he had many duties. The first duty was preaching Islam and educating the people. The main duty 
of the Prophet was to make people believe and to embrace in Islam and teach them Islam’s principles. He 
used several ways to achieve this goal. The first way was the mission. The Prophet spent all his time in 
Mecca in calling the people to Islam; he succeeded in converting the Medinans. The Prophet with his 
followers, continued in calling the people to Islam; the Prophet sent some of his companions to work as 
missionaries in far places. The first one sent to achieve the mission was Mis'ab Ibn 'Umayr, when the 
Prophet sent him to al-Madina to teach Muslims the Qur’an and lead them in prayers.
264
 The second way 
was education. The Prophet taught many people how to write and read. He asked the Qurayshī‘ prisoners 
captured in Badr battle to teach Muslim children how to read and write.
265
 In addition, the Prophet 
depended on the companions who read and write to write down the Qur’an, letters and treaties and he 
charged others to work as judges and governors.
266
 The third way was the Mosque. The first thing the 
Prophet did when he arrived in al-Madina was to establish a mosque, which is considered the main center 
in the religious and political spheres. The mosque had many functions like; it was a place for performing 
the prayers,
267
and for education Muslims in the principles of writing, reading and religion.
268
 Muslims 
usually used the mosque to negotiate their affairs, the Prophet called them to the mosque when there 
was something urgent to be discussed.
269
  
After discussing the means used by the Prophet to preach and to educate people Islam, it is important to 
clarify what is meant by jihad as many people believe the Prophetic government was characterized by the 
political authority because the Prophet practiced jihad. The Prophet depended on jihad only for preaching 
Islam peacefully as the Qur’an rejected the idea of forcing someone to believe in Islam. The Qur’an 
states” there shall be no coercion in matters of faith,
” 270
 “The truth[has now come] from your Sustainer: 
Let, then, him who wills, believe in it, and let him who wills, reject it,”
271
 “Whoever chooses to follow 
the right path follows it but for his own good; and whoever goes astray goes but astray to his own 
hurt.”
272
These verses mean that the Qur’an recognizes the freedom of belief; every individual is free to 
choose his or her religion. Therefore, forcing individuals in Islam is unacceptable, and anyone would 
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use force not peace means to promote religion must ignore the view of the person central in the 
Qur’an. In addition, the mission of the Prophet was based on persuading people to believe in Islam using 
peace means; it did not depend on force and violence. For example, when the Prophet settled in al-
Medina, there was a minority group who were the Jews, who did not want to believe in Islam. The 
Prophet agreed with them to do an agreement with the Muslims as each group in Medina knew their 
obligations and rights. The charter could be summarized in three points. The first point was that the Jews 
who entered into this chart are equal to others; they are protected from any violence of insult. The second 
point was that they had the freedom of worship. The third point was that the Jews enjoyed the same 
securities as Muslims. Hence, this agreement between the Prophet and the Jews proves that the Prophet 
was just with dealing with non-Islamic people. Also, it shows how the Prophet did not use force in 
spreading Islam in Medina; however, he used peace means with people of other faiths.
273
 Indeed, the 
Prophet practiced jihad for mainly two reasons. The first reason was that the Prophet protected Islam 
from attack. The second reason was that the Prophet guaranteed the spread of Islam belief without 
coercion.
274
 As we see, jihad was only practiced for defending Islam, not for forcing people to believe in 
Islam violently and the second body of the Prophetic government, what follows is the last body, which is 
the judicial government.  
The third body was the judicial power which was controlled by the Prophet under his direct control as he 
was the God’s messenger. Before Islam, the Arabs settled their disputes according to customary 
arbitration of tribal chiefs.
275
 The situation started to change after the development of Islam, because the 
Qur’an ordered Muslims to present their disputes to the Prophet, and it tells the Prophet to settle their 
disputes. 
276
 Indeed, the Prophet practiced the role of an arbitrator or mediator before his call to prophet-
hood and before his death. At the early beginning the Meccans referred their disputes to the Prophet as 
he was characterized by his intelligence, wisdom; they welcomed his judgment of his great attitude. They 
referred to him as al-amīn.
277
 Additionally, the judgment of the Prophet was not obligatory or final; the 
disputing parties had the right to execute his judgment or not. A Sunna reports that the Prophet settled a 
dispute between a creditor and a debtor by suggesting the creditor to accept to get half the debt if the 
debtor pays in installment.
278
 Hence, by stating suggesting, it means that the Prophet’s judgments were 
not enforceable; he was only a mediator. The Prophet settled only the disputes which were presented to 
him, though he did not oblige the parties to present their disputes to him. This is clear in the Madina 
                                                          
273
 Justice, Peace and Prophet Muhammad, available at http://www.al-islam.org/articles/justice-peace-and-prophet-muhammad-
sayyid-muhammad-rizvi 
274
 Qur’an, 11: 190-193; 217; IV: 74-75; 
275
 TYAN E, HISTOIRE DE L’ORGANISATION JUDICIAIRE EN PAYS D’ISLAM 62 (2
nd
 ed. 1960). 
276
 Qur'än, XXXVIII: 17-26. 
 AL-TABARī, JAMī’ AL-BAYāN ‘AN TA’WīL ĀY AL-QUR’āN 135-136 (2
nd
 ed. 1954). 
 QUR’āN, IV: 59. 
‘ALī, THE HOLY QUR’ĀN 198, 199. 
AL-TABARī, JAMī’ AL-BAYāN ‘AN TA’WīL ĀY AL-QUR’āN 157,158 (2
nd
 ed. 1954). 
 -QURTUBī, AL-JAMī’ LI AHKāM  AL-QUR’Ān 261, 266 (1
st 
ed. 1932-1950).  
277
 Lahoucine khabid, Mediation by Prophet, MUSLIMS AND NON-MUSLIMS APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 
http://www.academia.edu/7264568/Mediation_Muslim_and_non-Muslim_approach_to_conflict_resolution. 
278
 Lahoucine khabid, Mediation by Prophet, MUSLIMS AND NON-MUSLIMS APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 
http://www.academia.edu/7264568/Mediation_Muslim_and_non-Muslim_approach_to_conflict_resolution. 
 
 
39 
Constitution established by the Prophet, a provision stated the Prophet said” conciliation between 
Muslims is permissible, except for a conciliation that makes lawful unlawful and unlawful lawful". Also, the 
Prophet said: “Intercede so you will be rewarded.” Hence, by stating the word permissible, it means that 
Muslims had the freedom to present their disputes or not. After the rise of Islam, the responsibilities of the 
Prophet increased, so he had to choose some of his companions in the judicial field to help him. For 
example, the Prophet asked ‘Amr Ibn al-‘ās to judge a case under his observation. Also ‘Umar Ibn al-
Khatāb was a judge during the period of the Prophet,
279
 as well as Alī and Mu'ādh Ibn Jabal.
280
 All of the 
mentioned companions helped the Prophet to settle the disputes of the Arabs. Their judgments were not 
final as the Prophet’s were; the disputing parties had the right to present their dispute to the Prophet if 
they did not accept their initial judgment.
281
 In addition, the Prophetic government did not enforce taxes on 
people as the current governments enforce taxes on inheritance, sellers, apartments and income. 
However, the taxes system was known by the rightly guided caliphs. Even, al-Zaka’, was not enforced by 
the Prophetic government; however, it was a gift given by Muslims to the Prophet when he leaded them in 
the prayers.
282
 Thus, it is clear that the Prophet was not a king or a ruler as he neither enforced taxes nor 
executed judgments on Arabs; all he did was helping the Arabs to settle their disputes and to preach 
Islam.  
As we see, the lack of political authority in the Prophetic government. The legislative power as the 
supreme authority was held by God and the executive and judicial powers which were exercised by the 
Prophet in the name of God.
283
 The question arises as to what the form of the Prophet’s government 
was? We cannot say the government of the Prophet was a monarchy. Firstly, although the Qur’an is not 
against the idea of kingship, the Prophet did not want to be treated as a king. He said” I am not a king or 
a tyrant.”
284
 Or to be called as a king; he preferred to be called as the Messenger of God, and he said “I 
am the servant of God and his Messengers.”
285
 Additionally, the conditions of kingship government did 
not meet during the era of the Prophet. 
286
A king gets the power based on heredity, while the Prophet got 
the religious authority from God through God’s revelation, which controlled the Prophet’s acts.
287
  
In addition to the kingship government, we also cannot say that the government of the Prophet was a 
republic.
288
 First of all, both the Qur’an and Sunna did not mention such a system. In addition, in the 
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republican system, the president or the king is elected and chosen by the citizens for a fixed term; while 
the Prophet was chosen from God for unfixed term. 
289
 Indeed, the Prophet’s government was created to 
apply divine law which is embodied in the Qur’an. Divine law was obligatory on Arabs including the 
Prophet himself and his family,” because the ruler, equally with those who are ruled, is subject to the 
transcendent law.”
290
 Moreover, revelation controlled the works of the Prophet as the Qur’an stated” Had 
he invented against Us any sayings, We would have sized  him by the right hand, then We would surely 
have out his life-vein and not one of you could have defended him.”
291
 Therefore, the Prophet was limited 
by God’s revelation. Therefore, we find many verses in the Qur’an criticizing the Prophet because 
sometimes his Ijtihād was wrong. 
292
Therefore, we can say the Prophet’s government was characterized 
by two forms of governments a theocratic and a legal one. 
 The first form is that the Prophetic government was characterized by a theocratic form “in which the 
supreme power has been attributed either to God, or to a god, or some other superhuman being, or to an 
Idea. The men who exercised rule were not regarded as its possessors, but as the servants and 
vicegerents of an unseen ruler, free from the weakness of human nature.”
293
Theocratic government 
means the source of power is God and he delivers directly or indirectly a Messenger to govern the people 
with his name and those people must obey him.
294
 Indeed the Prophet’s government met the conditions of 
such a theocratic government. The source of power: the legislative, executive and judicial powers were 
held by God. God sent his Messenger Muhammad to deliver the divine law and all people must obey him 
because he got his authority from God.  
The second form is that the Prophetic government was characterized by a legal government because it 
took its legitimacy from divine law and functioned according to its rules in order to be implemented on 
earth.
295
 Thus, the Prophetic government was neither kingship nor republic, but rather a theocratic and a 
legal government. Thus, we can say the main and only goal of the Prophet was preaching Islam and 
educating people on the divine law based on the Qur’an, which is considered the legislative body. The 
Prophet was not a king or a president; he was the Messenger of God who educated people about divine 
law through God’s revelation. Thus, divine law was established and promoted before the death of the 
Prophet. No one has the right to educate people in such divine law except the Prophet as he was the only 
person who had this authority as the Messenger of God. As we see the Prophetic government was not 
characterized by political authority but rather by a theocratic and a legal one. What follows is a discussion 
showing how the Caliphate did not unite Muslims, a view which is different from the views of Sanhūrī, 
‘Imāra and al-Banā. 
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B. Myth of Muslims unity during the Caliphate.  
Unlike Sanhūrī, ‘Imāra and al-Banā,
296
 who believed the Caliphate has an important role which is uniting 
Muslims, I believe the Caliphate did not unite Muslims. I believe the definition of Muslims unity means that 
all Muslims must be under one Caliphate and having one caliph. However, this did not happen in Islam.  
On the one hand, starting from the rightly guided caliphs, there were two centers of Caliphate in the same 
time, one for Ali in Kūffa, and the other for Mu‘áūya in Damascus.  On the other hand, after the era of the 
rightly guided caliphs there were three centers of Caliphate at the same time, the Abbasid Caliphate in 
Baghdad, the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt and the Umayyad Caliphate in Andalusia.  
The first evidence proving the Caliphate did not help Muslims to be united is that there were two caliphs 
during the years 658 to 661. After the death of ‘uthmān, ‘Alī was chosen to be the caliph of Muslims from 
660 to 655 in Kūffa. Ali’s Caliphate was well-known by rumors that Alī killed ‘Uthmān to gain power. 
People started to believe in these rumors after Ali did not accept investigating ‘Uthmān’s killing. In Syria, 
Mu‘áūya wanted take revenge on ‘Utham’s murders as Aisha did.  A civil war had broken out between 
Aisha and her supporters and Alī won the war. Then, Alī faced Mu‘áūya’s forces, who used a conspiracy 
to their advantage. Mu‘áūya ordered his forces to spear a page from the Qur’an on the tips of their lances. 
When Alī’s forces saw this, they wavered as they did not want to fight the Qur’an. Both forces separated 
and the issue was settled by arbitration of ‘Amr Ibn al-‘ás and Abá Mūsā al-Ash’aī in Mu‘áūya ’s favor. 
Mu‘áūya declared himself as the caliph in Damascus in 658, although Alī was the official chosen caliph 
after ‘Uthmān. 
297
Hence, during the years 658 to 661, there were two centers of the Caliphate at the same 
time, one for Alī in Kūfa and the other for Mu‘áūya in Damascus. Consequently, the caliphate during the 
last caliph ‘Alī, did not unite Muslims. What follow is another evidence proving how the Caliphate did not 
unite Muslims after the period of the rightly guided caliphs; there were three centers of Caliphate at the 
same time. 
The second evidence proving the Caliphate did not let Muslims act in a unified manner is that there were 
three centers of Caliphate at the same time. The first Caliphate was the Fatimid Caliphate which was 
established first in Tunisia in 909. Then it expanded its territory because it needed a more central capital 
than Tunisia which is why Egypt was chosen. Then, they conquered Egypt in 969 and established the city 
of Cairo as a place for its empire; they controlled Egypt from 969 to 1171.
298
 The second Caliphate was 
the Abbasid caliphate. During the Abbasid Caliphate, Al-Mansūr, one of the Abbasid caliphs, established 
a new capital for the empire in 762 in Baghdad which ended at 1258. 
299
 The third Caliphate was the 
Umayyad Caliphate.  When the Umayyad Caliphate of Damascus was defeated by the Abbasids in 750, 
the last surviving member of the Umayyad ‘Abd al-Rahmān fled to Spain and established a Caliphate 
capital there declaring himself as a caliph from 929 to 1031. Looking the dates of the three Caliphates, we 
will see the appearance of three centers of the Caliphate for a time from 969 to 1031. Consequently, the 
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Caliphate during Ali from 656 to 616 and after did not unite Muslims. What follows is proof that the 
Caliphate was a source of violence. 
C. Myth of the Caliphate’s Positivity:  
Unlike Sanhūrī, ‘Imāra and al-Banā,
300
 I believe the Caliphate did not help the Islamic community to live in 
a fair and just environment. Like Rāziq,
301
 I believe the Caliphate was a source of corruption for Muslims. I 
see most of the Caliphate eras were corrupts even during the time of the rightly guided caliphs. Stories of 
corruption in the Caliphate are numerous in Islam. In the following paragraph, I present some corrupts 
stories happening some of the Caliphates era. Starting from the rightly guided caliphs’ era, it is well 
known in Islamic history that corruption prevailed during ‘Uthmān’s caliphate. ‘Uthmān exploited his power 
by hiring many members of his family in high positions.
302
 He hired al-Walīd ben Akaba as a manger of al-
Kūfa; and ‘Abd allah Ben Sarah to be the manager of Egypt and Mu‘áūya to be responsible for al-Sham 
as of them were ‘Uthmān’s relatives.
303
  
Hence, the administration during the Caliphate of ‘Uthmān was corrupted by exploiting his authority by 
hiring his family in high positions regardless of whether they were qualified or not. Like the period of the 
rightly guided caliphs which was characterized by exploiting the authority, the Umayyads and the 
Abbasids eras were characterized by inheritance the caliph position and violence. According to Muslim 
tradition, it is well known that the Umayyads are accused of switching Khilāft al-nubuwwa to Khilāfat al-
mulk.
304
 Several of these accusations came from the Abbasid. For instance, al-Jahīz, an Abbasid era poet 
polemicist, named the year of Mu‘áūya ’s succession to the Caliphate that “year of schism, coercion, 
oppression and violence, a year in which the imamate, or the Caliphate became a monarchy after the 
fashion of Chosroes, and the Caliphate a tyranny worthy of a Caesar.”
305
 Inheriting the position of the 
caliph started when Mu‘áūya obtained authority. Before Mu‘áūya ’s death in 680, he gave the authority to 
his son Yazīd as the subsequent caliph. Later this practice became normalized and all the subsequent 
Caliphates were based on hereditary kingship. 
 Like the Umayyads, the Abbasids were also known for their corruption. The Abbasids gave themselves 
the right to inherit the Caliphate. The Abbasids court poet, al-Buhturī, called the caliph al-Mu’tazz as “the 
heir of the [Prophet’s] Mantle, the Staff [of the Prophet] and the authority of God.”
306
By doing so, they 
gave themselves God and the Prophet’s authority as no one could contradict them. Hence, by having the 
Abbasid caliph the same authority of God, and the Prophet, their actions were not limited and no one 
could contradict them. As we see ‘Uthmān, the umayyads and the abbasids’s Caliphates were 
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characterized by corruption, what follows is a discussion of the differences between the Caliphate and the 
civil government. 
307
 What follows is an argument on al-Khilāfa al-sahīha and Khilāfa al-nāqysa ’s practice which were 
characterized  by harmful for Muslims.  
D. Al-Khilāfa al-nāqysa and Khilāfat al-mulk in practice:  
In my opinion, I see both al-Khilāfa al-sahīha and al-Khilāfa al- nāqysa were damaging for Muslims. 
Sanhūrī divided the Caliphate into two types: the first type is al-Khilāfa al-sahīha and the second type is 
al-Khilāfa al- nāqysa. Sanhūrī defined the meaning of the first caliphate, al-Khilāfa al-sahīha  which must 
reflect the Sunna conditions, a caliph has to be a Muslim, free, healthy, brave, and fair and Qurayshī‘. He 
also defined the meaning al- Khilāfa al- nāqysa , as a caliph who does meet not have all the required 
conditions or was chosen by voluntary allegiance, and gaining the power by sheer coercion. Sanhūrī 
accepted al- Khilāfa al- nāqysa in case the impossibility to implement al-Khilāfa al-sahiha. Sanhūrī argued 
that in general Muslims must implement al-Khilāfa al-sahīha which first was applicable during the period 
of the rightly guided caliphs. According to Sanhūrī, al-Khilāfa al-sahīha which embodied all the Sunna 
conditions, is the original Caliphate that all Muslims must follow. However, he also argued that if there 
had been an excuse to not implement al-Khilāfa al-sahīha, Muslims could have implemented al-Khilāfa al- 
nāqysa . When Rāziq claimed that the Caliphate was a source of evil for Muslims, Sanhūrī replied that we 
cannot ignore the corruption which was commonplace during al-Khilāfa al-nāqysa starting with the 
Umayyads and continuing. Sanhūrī claimed that the corruption which happened was because the caliphs 
did not follow al-Khilāfa al-sahiha.
308
 Sanhūrī recognized the corruption starting with the umayyads; thus, 
he called it and all the subsequent Caliphates al-Khilāfa al-nāqysa. Hence, we can say by Sanhūrī ’s 
accepting the implementation of al-Khilāfa al-nāqysa , he accepted the absence of the Caliphate 
conditions. For example, he accepted that a caliph could be unfair, a feature which is against Islam. The 
Qur’an states” when you judge between people, you judge with justice.”
309
 Also, he accepted that a caliph 
could be fearful, an unacceptable character for a ruler; a ruler must be strong enough to make important 
decisions like going to war. He also accepted a caliph’s disable from performing with full energy. Hence, 
Sanhūrī agreed to accept al-Khilāfa al-nāqysa although some of the conditions were against the Sunni 
caliphate conditions and the Qur’an. Additionally, Sanhūrī accepted how Mu‘áūya and most of the 
subsequent caliphs gained power by violence although the original caliph gained power by allegiance. By 
Sanhūrī’s acceptance of al- Khilāfa al-nāqysa, he also accepted corruption and the possibility of an 
oppressive caliph, a view which is unacceptable and does not help the Islamic community to evolve. As 
we see the negativity of al-Khilāfa al-nāqysa said by Sanhūrī, what follows is the view of Ibn Taymiyya 
regarding Khilāfa al-mulk in which I believe it was harmful for Muslims. 
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 Like al-Khilāfa al-nāqysa was characterized as being damaging for Muslims, Khilāfat al-mulk was a 
harmful practice for Muslims too. This was recognized by Ibn Taymiyya. 
Like Sanhūrī, Ibn Taymiyya divided the Caliphate into two types: the first type was Khilāfat al-nubuwwa, 
which is similar to al-Khilāfa al-sahiha and based on the government of the rightly guided caliphs, and 
Khilāfat al-mulk, which is similar to al-Khilāfa al-nāqysa  and based on Mu‘áūya’s caliphate and the 
subsequent ones. Although Ibn Taymiyya did not place the Umayyads and the Abbasids under the 
category of Khilāfat al-nubuwwa, he admitted their legitimate rules because according to him if a society 
had an excuse to not implement Khilāfat al-nubuwwa, it could apply Khilāfat al-mulk. Therefore, Ibn 
Taymiyya believed that both the Umayyads and Abbasids had an excuse to not apply Khilāfa al-
nubuwwa, so it was acceptable for them to apply Khilāfa al-mulk. What Ibn Taymiyya means by an 
excuse is confusing. Also, confusing is the excuse of the Umayyads and Abbasids to not implement 
Khilāfat al-nubuwwa, which is considered the ideal government according to Ibn Taymiyya.  If he meant 
by excuse a caliph who did not have all the required Sunni conditions, his position is similar to Sanhūrī; 
he accepted the unjust rule and gaining authority through violence. Indeed, Ibn Taymiyya accepted 
despotic rulers like Sanhūrī by saying direct political authority is essential for political and social order 
whether the ruler is ruling justly or unjustly. So, it is clear that Ibn Taymiyya was against democracy; he 
was against revolutions and demonstrations whether the ruler was fair or unfair. Hence, Ibn Taymiyya 
accepted all autocratic rulers over fourteen centuries after the period of the rightly guided caliphs as he 
accepted the Umayyads and the Abbasids. In addition, it is clear that if Ibn Taymiyya had been alive 
during the Arab spring, he would not accept all the political turmoil against the rulers fearing from 
anarchy. We see Yāsser Borhāmī and Sheikh Muhammed Hasan, two of the thousands of people who 
follow Ibn Taymiyya’s ideology claiming the same idea. During the 25
th
 January revolution, they claimed 
that what Egyptians did was against Shari ’a; Egyptians should not revolt against the ruler.
310
 To sum up, 
Sanhūrī and Ibn Taymiyya share the same ideology. They accept autocratic rulers, although the Qur’an 
itself ignores those rulers. With Sanhūrī and Ibn Taymiyya’s acceptance of implementing both al-Khilāfa  
al-nāqysa  and Khilāfat al-mulk, I believe these two systems are unacceptable for Muslims, as both of 
them prevent the citizen from practicing his or her right to revolt against the ruler; a right which is stated in 
most constitutions. As we see the harmful systems of al-Khilāfa al-nāqysa and Khilāfat al-mulk, what 
follows is a view proving that Shari’ a can be implemented without the reestablishment of Caliphate. 
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E. Shari’ a’s Implementation without the Caliphate: 
This chapter starts with a discussion of the difference between the Caliphate and the civil government, 
followed by arguing that Shari’a can be implemented without the restoration of the Caliphate. 
It is confusing what does it mean by the Caliphate as a government as many people think that the 
Caliphate is obligatory because it is a religious system and applies Shari’a. On the one hand, in the civil 
government, the president is elected and chosen by the citizens for a fixed term; the citizens may remove 
and disobey the president if they see that he misuses the authority even if he applies Shari’a. On the 
other hand, the Islamic government is not necessary the government applying shari’a or religious 
ordinances; however, the government becomes Islamic when the ruler has the same authority of God and 
the Prophet and must be obeyed as he represents both. In the Islamic government citizens cannot revolt 
against the ruler. Hence, the difference between the civil government and the caliphate is not the matter 
of implementing Shari’a, but the features embodied in the ruler.  
It could be said that the Caliphate is a civil system as I stated above neither the Qur’an nor the Prophet 
do mention such government. During the righty guided caliphs, the caliph was a person following the 
Prophet in the time not in his roles or authorities. Later, the title had been changed to be a person having 
the same authorities of God and the Prophet which led to the appearance of chaos between Muslims.
311
 I 
believe the Islamic government is acceptable and equal to the civil government if the ruler is elected and 
removed by the citizens. However, such system in unacceptable if the ruler has the same authorities of 
God and the Prophet as many scholars argued like Abu Hurayra. 
Unlike Sanhūrī, ‘Imāra, Ibn Taymiyya and ISIS and al-Banā,
312
’s thinking that the Caliphate is obligatory 
as it implements Shari ‘a, I believe the Shari ‘a can be applied without the need for restoration the 
Caliphate. Several Arab countries like Egypt, Afghanistan and Iraq have adopted constitutions requiring 
the law of the state to be compatible with Shari ‘a. For example, in the current Egyptian constitution, 
Article 2 states that the main principles of Shari ‘a are considered the main source of legislation. Article 2 
does not articulate what is meant by the principles of Shari ‘a. In my opinion, I see the principles of Shari 
‘a as the Qur’an states as being, justice,
313
 equality, 
314
 freedom of belief,
315
 freedom of worship,
316
 
freedom from violence,
317
 and freedom from unfairness.
318
 It can be agreed that if any state implements 
these principles, it will be stabilized, evolve the society and chaos evaporate. These principles can be 
applied without the need to reestablish the Caliphate. Indeed, by stating the mentioned three states the 
application of Shari ‘a in their constitutions, they meant to follow the principles which I mentioned. This is 
happening without a caliph. Hence, in brief, there are many states which implement Shari ‘a principles 
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although the caliphate was abolished ninety years ago. Hence, the arguments that the Caliphate is 
obligatory as it alone applies Shari ‘a is invalid. 
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VIII. Conclusion: 
This thesis has presented the legal thought concerning the Caliphate of six sunni scholars and ISIS from 
the  1920s to 2014. It presented views of two scholars in the 1920s, Rāziq who did not believe in the 
obligation of the Caliphate in Shari’ a, and Sanhūrī who believed in the Caliphate as it implements Shari’ 
a and unites Muslims. The views of two scholars on the Caliphate from 1970s to 1990s were then 
presented. ‘Imāra who had a contradictory opinion on Rāziq’s book and lately supported strongly the 
reestablishment of the Caliphate. And Abū Zayd, who responded to ‘Imāra’s criticism of Rāziq’s book, and 
disbelieved in the Caliphate. This is followed by the presentation of  the thinking about the Caliphate of 
two scholars and ISIS  after the 25
th
 January 2011 revolution. Al-Banā as the representative of the Muslim 
Brotherhood who took the side of the restoration of the Caliphate, Ibn Taymiyya as the representative of 
the Salafists believed the most important issue is the establishment of a government to avoid chaos. 
Finally a letter written by ISIS in discussing their arguments for their declaration to restore the Caliphate 
was presented. This thesis took the side of Rāziq and Abū Zayd as it ignores the necessity of the 
Caliphate based on the Qur’an and the Prophetic government. It disagrees with Sanhūrī, ‘Imāra and al-
Banā as it believes the Caliphate broke Muslim unity and introduced corruption to the Islamic community. 
In addition, it does not agree with the ideology of Sanhūrī and Ibn Taymiyya to establish al-Khilāfa al-
sahīha and al-Khilāfa al-nāqysa as both of them are harmful to Muslims. Finally, unlike Sanhūrī, al-Bana, 
‘Imāra and ISIS, this thesis argues that the Shari ’a can be implemented without the reestablishment of 
Shari ’a. 
